University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

2020

RHETORIC AND PERCEPTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE
PROPOSED NORTHMET MINE ON MINNESOTA’S IRON RANGE
Sophia J. Frank

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd
Part of the Environmental Studies Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Frank, Sophia J., "RHETORIC AND PERCEPTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE PROPOSED NORTHMET MINE
ON MINNESOTA’S IRON RANGE" (2020). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers.
11609.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/11609

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by
an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

RHETORIC AND PERCEPTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE PROPOSED
NORTHMET MINE ON MINNESOTA’S IRON RANGE
By
SOPHIA J FRANK
B.A., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 2011
Thesis
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Science
in Environmental Studies
The University of Montana
Missoula, MT
May 2020
Approved by:
Scott Whittenburg, Dean of The Graduate School
Graduate School
Neva Hassanein, Chair
Environmental Studies
Jill Belsky
Society & Conservation
Steve Schwarze
Communication Studies

ABSTRACT
Frank, Sophie, M.S., Spring 2020
Environmental Studies
The struggle for social license: A case study on public perceptions of the NorthMet
controversy in northern Minnesota
Chairperson: Neva Hassanein
Northern Minnesota is rich in natural resources, perhaps most uniquely the
expansive mineral deposits of the Mesabi and Vermilion Ranges. The steel
and taconite mining opportunities along these veins helped facilitate the
rapid growth and infrastructure development of the area and is an
important part of the identity of the region northwest of Duluth, aptly
known as Iron Range. In addition to iron deposits, The Iron Range
contains large deposits of copper and nickel. Recently proposed coppernickel mining projects by PolyMet and Twin Metals have garnered a great
deal of public controversy, especially around issues of economic
revitalization of the region and potential pollution associated with this type
of mining. This thesis considers public perceptions of the proposed
NorthMet mine in the Arrowhead Region of Minnesota. By considering
the strategies both pro-mining and environmental groups have used in an
attempt to sway public opinion, analyzing public comments, and
conducting interviews, this research addresses how considering the
NorthMet controversy in terms of the concept of social license to operate
helps to frame a conversation about public perceptions of PolyMet and the
proposed mine itself. A term coined by the mining industry, social license
to operate (SLO) refers to a society’s general acceptance of a corporation
or project, based on considerations of legitimacy, credibility and trust.
SLO is considered separately from regulatory acceptance. While a social
license to operate is not strictly required for a mining project to succeed,
failure to achieve SLO may affect the efficient progress of a project
through resulting protests, blockades, litigation, and other methods.
In the following research, I consider a breadth of data, including rhetorical
strategies implemented by PolyMet, pro-mining groups, and
environmental groups to sway public opinion about the project, a random
sampling of public comments on the Final Environmental Impact
Statement, and a handful of semi-structured interviews with individuals
from the Arrowhead region of Minnesota. Presented as a case study, this
thesis contributes to a growing body of academic literature about social
license to operate and community perception of extractive industries.
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Figure 1 - Map of case study area
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INTRODUCTION
Driving out of the Twin Cities, the billboards splashed with flashy advertisements
for art events and accident insurance begin to phase out as you move through the closely
packed box homes of the suburbs and onto northbound 35. As the landscape shifts to
lakes, farms, small towns, and more lakes, the billboards shift to beautiful landscape
photography of the stark rocky beaches along Lake Superior, the wolves and bears in the
wild forests, fishing in the vast lakes of the Boundary Waters, and snowmobiling through
the rolling forests of the Iron Range. They promise the wildness and luxuriousness of a
vacation to northern country.
As you crest the final hill, the world opens up—the boundless blue of Lake
Superior stretches forever in front of you, the smokestacks and commercial ships of
Duluth sit below. The drive north from Minneapolis is one I have done countless times
since I was a kid, fighting with my sister in the backseat. It is a drive that is familiar to
enough city folk that the two-hour car ride to Duluth quickly turns to four or five hours of
gridlock if you leave Minneapolis on a Friday night in the summer. Still, every time I
crest that hill and look out over the great expanse, my heart catches in my throat. This is
the North Country.
While my familiarity with northern Minnesota as a frequent seasonal tourist is a
familiar one for residents of the region, tourism is only a part of the Arrowhead region of
Minnesota. Northern Minnesota is rich in natural resources, which includes timber, game,
and water, but perhaps most unique is its expansive mineral deposits. The steel and
taconite mining opportunities along these veins helped facilitate the rapid growth and
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infrastructure development of the area and is an important part of the identity of the
region northwest of Duluth, aptly known as Iron Range.
The Iron Range contains one of the largest unmined deposits of copper and nickel
in the world (Phadke 2017:163). These earth metals are critical for plumbing, electrical
infrastructure, and clean energy technology (e.g., wind turbines, electric cars), and they
enjoy both reliably high market value and demand (Phadke 2017:163). In 2009, PolyMet
Mining Corporation began the permitting process for NorthMet, an open-pit coppernickel mining project in the Mesabi Iron Range Mining District near Hoyt Lakes,
Minnesota. NorthMet would be the first sulfide ore copper-nickel (SOCN), or hard-rock,
mine in Minnesota. Over the past 10 years the project has garnered a significant amount
of public criticism by environmental and human health advocacy groups, as well as
support from groups who highlight the boost that new mining operations would provide
for local economies. PolyMet has successfully undergone a 10-year government-led
environmental review process and in 2018 completed a land exchange of 6,650 acres with
the United States Forest Service (USFS) in preparation to begin building mining
infrastructure (PolyMet 2018).
In order to begin mining operations, the company needs to obtain up to sixteen
required permits from the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR), the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), and the Minnesota Department of Health
(MDH) (Minnesota DNR 2018). While PolyMet successfully acquired all 16 permits by
spring 2019, significant pushback from anti-mining groups and citizens has led to
ongoing litigation and the overturning of four of the originally granted permits.

4

Such pushback calls into question whether or not PolyMet has successfully taken
community needs into account and achieved public support. For instance, Minnesota
nonprofit Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness (2019) refers to the permitting
process as “opaque” and “lack[ing] public input” in a way that favors PolyMet. Tom
Landwehr, former commissioner of the DNR and current executive director of the
Campaign to Save The Boundary Waters, has similarly criticized the state permitting
process as being incomplete, asserting that it only “relates to environmental impact. So, it
doesn’t look at economic, it doesn’t look at cultural, it doesn’t look at quality of life. It’s
a very narrow prescriptive. It doesn’t look at health” (Carlson and Entzel 2019).
Scholars have described the dynamics of public participation in case studies on
other environmental controversies, noting how regulatory decisions often fail to eliminate
controversy or fully take public concerns into account. In a case study on the Fernald
radium cleanup in Ohio, for example, Jennifer Hamilton noted a pattern wherein
regulatory risk perception relied on public input as “a mechanism for legitimating
scientific decisions” rather than as a substantial contribution to democratic decisionmaking (Hamilton 2003:298). Rhetorical scholar Frank Fischer points to this as a
systemic problem, wherein regulatory decision-making regarding environmental health is
firmly rooted in scientific and technological considerations of the issue (Fischer
2000:91). While public perception and cultural knowledge is generally outside the
bounds of regulatory environmental permitting, the mining industry has acknowledged
that gaining public approval is often a necessary component of a successful mining
project (Boutilier and Thomas 2011). This public approval is encompassed in a
framework, which originated in the mining industry, called social license to operate. This
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framework considers issues of legitimacy, credibility, and trust as aspects of gaining
public approval for a mining project.
By considering the strategies both pro-mining and environmental groups have
used in an attempt to sway public opinion, analyzing public comments, and conducting
interviews, this research addresses how considering the NorthMet controversy in terms of
the concept of social license to operate helps to frame a conversation about public
perceptions of PolyMet and the proposed mine itself. In the following research, I consider
a breadth of data, including rhetorical strategies implemented by PolyMet, pro-mining
groups, and environmental groups to sway public opinion about the project, a random
sampling of public comments on the Final Environmental Impact Statement, and a
handful of semi-structured interviews with individuals from the Arrowhead region of
Minnesota. Presented as a case study, this thesis contributes to a growing body of
academic literature about social license to operate and community perception of
extractive industries.
The following chapter provides a literature review of the rhetorical frameworks I
use when considering strategies implemented by both sides of the NorthMet debate to
leverage public opinion and the concept of social license to operate. It also offers an
introduction to the case study area, including a brief overview of the many intertwining
legacies of the region that serve to frame the issue and inform public perception. I then
consider the rhetorical strategies used primarily by PolyMet and WaterLegacy (a
prominent environmental organization that has remained an active voice throughout the
ongoing conversation) to define the issue and leverage public opinion for or against the
mine, tying it into the social license to operate framework. Next I look at public

6

comments on the 2015 FEIS and interviews conducted in February 2020 to look deeper at
public perceptions of NorthMet using social license to operate to frame the discussion. In
the conclusion I examine the utility of the social license to operate framework, including
how it serves as a useful tool when considering the NorthMet debate and its limitations as
a wholistic framework. Finally, I end with a brief discussion of implications and
limitations of this study, as well as opportunities for future research.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter begins with an introduction of rhetorical frameworks used in other
case studies about particular environmental controversies that I will later use to consider
strategies used by PolyMet and WaterLegacy to leverage public opinion. Next, I
introduce the concept of social license to operate and how it has moved from a model
within the mining industry to an academic framework for considering extractive projects
in terms of community members’ perceptions. In the second half of this chapter I
introduce the case study area in northern Minnesota, including the intertwining legacies
of the region that serve as critical context when framing the controversies surround the
proposed NorthMet mine.
Analytical Framework
Rhetorical Strategies
Rhetorical strategies used by opposing sides to affect public opinion in
environmental controversies have been the subject matter of a great breadth of literature.
One example is from the Spotted Owl controversy of the early 1990s, where timber
companies were pitted against environmentalists in the Pacific Northwest over the fate of
old growth forests. In an analysis of the Spotted Owl Debate, Jonathon Lange (1993)
addresses the rhetorical strategies used by both sides, including the four-pronged
rhetorical strategy of “mirroring and matching.” This strategy involves (1) “framing and
reframing” the issue by wrangling “facts, explanations, and interpretations… to
discursively construct a reality favorable to one’s own rhetorical goals” (Lange
1993:246); (2) “selecting high and low data,” or which data is chosen and presented by
each side to garner public support and demonstrate that “science favors their position,”
8

and which data is obscured in the process (Lange 1993:248); (3) “vilifying and
ennobling,” in the way each side characterizes both themselves and their opponents
(Lange 1993:249); (4) “simplifying the issue,” by obscuring complexities and thereby
allowing disparate sides to dramatize the issue in the public sphere (Lange 1993:250).
Another example of framing rhetorical strategies used to leverage public opinion
is the Fernald radium mine cleanup in Ohio, where a debate raged over whether cleanup
of a highly toxic mine should happen immediately or should be postponed so that the
medical research industry could use the radium waste in cancer research. In her case
study on this controversial issue (2003), Jennifer Hamilton utilizes a similar framework
in considering the rhetorical strategies used by both proponents of cleaning up the mine
quickly and proponents of holding off so that radium mining waste could be utilized in
cancer research. Hamilton highlights three main rhetorical strategies utilized by
participants in the debate: (1) “Defining a situation,” by highlighting a dominant storyline
and choosing what information is selected and what is deflected by the definition; (2)
“Identification,” by creating bridges between stakeholder groups to create an “us,” and
subsequently drawing a line in the sand between “us” and “them;” (3) “Circumference,”
or creating boundaries around a controversy (e.g., in space or time) in order to define the
scope of a situation, thereby obviating what is not within the defined borders (Hamilton
2003:294). Within this framework she considers how technical rationality (e.g., scientific
knowledge and comparisons) and cultural rationality (e.g., experiential knowledge,
historical precedent, analogy) are leveraged within each strategy to define or affect risk
assessment varies amongst stakeholders (Hamilton 2003:293). In other words,
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stakeholder perception is affected by scientific “facts,” but also by cultural context and
personal or historical experiences.
These frameworks for considering rhetorical strategies used to influence public
opinion highlight both how information is presented and for what purpose. As observed
by Lange in the Spotted Owl controversy, success is “measured not only by the outcome
of the issues in question, but by favorable or unfavorable publicity as well, showing the
connection between these processes and the overall information campaign for public
opinion” (Lange 1993:252). This emphasis on swaying public opinion in tandem with
changing the outcome of the PolyMet mine is to some extent apparent in the rhetorical
strategies utilized by both the mining industry and environmental groups. While
rhetorical strategies in public discourse surrounding the PolyMet project have the
potential to affect official permitting process (e.g., by the Minnesota DNR), they are
more directly related to affecting public opinion. In discourse surrounding PolyMet’s
NorthMet project, this “campaign for public opinion” can be considered in terms of an
effort to gain or block an informal social license to operate.

Social License to Operate
A term coined by the mining industry, social license to operate (SLO) refers to a
society’s general acceptance of a corporation or project, considered separately from
regulatory acceptance (Holley and Mitcham 2016:18). While a social license to operate is
not strictly required for a project to succeed, the social and business risk of not obtaining
an SLO is widely regarded in the business community as ample reason to strive towards
achieving one (Holley and Mitcham 2016:19, Moffat and Zhang 2014). Specifically,
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members of the business community and scholars have acknowledged the increasing
influence that communities affected by extractive industries may have on the smooth and
timely progress of a project in the form of protests, blockades, litigation, media
campaigns, and lobbying (Prno and Slocombe 2012, Campbell and Roberts 2010).
Positive, ongoing public relationships also serve to build a positive image of the mining
industry and “help ensure greater salability of junior projects to larger, more reputationsensitive firms” (Prno and Slocombe 2012:347).
Originally developed by the business community to describe the methods of
gaining public support for extractive industries, the concept of social license to operate
has more recently been used by scholars (Holley and Mitcham 2016, Conde and Le
Billon 2017, Koivurova et al. 2015, Prno and Slocombe 2012) as a framework for
understanding mining communities and their support or resistance to particular projects.
The present case study on the proposed NorthMet mine is situated within the SLO
literature, contributing to the analysis of how public support may be gained and lost
throughout the early stages of a mining project.
Social license to operate includes the three major tenets of legitimacy, credibility,
and trust, which can be considered as a three-rung ladder that is climbed step by step to
achieve full SLO (Moffat and Zhang 2014, Koivurova et al. 2015). The most basic level
of social license is legitimacy, which is the acceptance – by an individual, a stakeholder
group, or a larger community – that “authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are
appropriate, proper, and just” (Koivurova et al. 2015:198). In considering mining projects
this may include economic viability, environmental impact, social justice, legal
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precedence, and technical or scientific ability as it relates to interactions between the
mining company, the project, and the community.
After legitimacy comes credibility, which can be considered in terms of authority
figures (in this case study, PolyMet, Glencore, and to some extent the mining industry as
a whole) staying true to their promises and dealing fairly, honestly, with an acceptable
amount of transparency, and without significant sociopolitical risk (Koivurova et al.
2015:198). While credibility is ultimately assigned to the specific mining company
involved, functionally it includes issues of historical precedence and how the region has
been treated by mining companies in the past, which informs community member’s
biases and may affect their baseline tendencies towards trust in extractive industries.
Trust is the final level of SLO and may only be achieved if both legitimacy and
credibility are present. Trust can be considered in terms of interactional trust (i.e., the
project managers listen and engage in conversation with the community, are generally
trustworthy, and demonstrate reciprocity), and institutionalized trust (i.e., the project
managers and stakeholders hold mutual regard for each other’s interests) (Boutilier and
Thomas 2011:4). If legitimacy, credibility, and trust are each fully realized, the final rung
of the social license to operate ladder is psychological identification with the process, in
which a given community considers the mining operation to be a core piece of their
identity. Such identification is only attained in “communities that have full trust in a
company [and] believe that the company will always act in the community’s best
interest” (Koivurova et al. 2015:199).
Social license to operate is best considered in greyscale rather than as a black or
white model; the degree to which social license has been secured depends on how many
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of the levels have been achieved. Within this model, psychological identification is a
scenario in which trust, credibility, and legitimacy are all perceived by the community.
Moving down the ladder, approval is when both credibility and legitimacy have been
achieved but not trust, and acceptance is when a community sees a project as legitimate
but not credible. If a community rejects the legitimacy, credibility, and trustworthiness of
a project, social license to operate is withheld. SLO may also be withdrawn during a
process or shift between levels (Boutilier and Thomas 2011:2). There is often a difference
in level of SLO granted between different stakeholder groups or discourse communities,
where a discourse community is “a group of people who holds and communicates similar
ideas, beliefs, and social goals” (Campbell and Roberts 2010:211, Boutilier and Thomas
2011).
While SLO originated in the mining industry, as a model of building support for
extractive projects, researchers have also used the framework of social license to operate
to analyze community conflicts surrounding various extractive industries. Holley and
Mitcham’s 2016 analysis of the proposed Pebble Mine in Alaska utilized both social
license to operate to consider whether the mine had community support, as well as
corporate responsibility to consider how the mining company responded to community
needs (Holley and Mitcham 2016:25). Through their study of the Pebble Mine they made
two major conclusions. First, while scientific data was not likely to change public opinion
(either for or against), access to scientific data did help build interactional trust. Second,
incorporating public voices into the project design and risk / benefit negotiation was a
critical component to successful SLO and corporate responsibility (Holley and Mitcham
2016:26).
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According to Conde and Le Billion’s review of 224 case studies, a community’s
decision to resist or support proposed mining projects is most often based on four factors:
(1) the mining project (e.g., geographical features, environmental impacts, livelihoods);
(2) community trends and relationships (e.g., marginalization, mining history and
economic dependency, relationship to place and place values, and alliances); (3) the
mining company (corporate social responsibility, willingness to listen to community
needs); or (4) government and policy (e.g., pro-industry policies, criminalization of
dissent, participatory processes) (Conde and Le Billon 2017).
While using the social license to operate framework to consider specific case
studies is increasing in use, it remains a relatively new concept that could benefit from
increased application. For instance, Prno and Slocombe call for “further investigation” of
case studies within an SLO framework that could shed light on “which governance
models function best and in what combination, and how model effectiveness varies
through differing social, political, and economic contexts” (Prno and Slocombe
2012:354). Since 2010, there have been over 200 new mining conflicts per year
worldwide (Conde and Le Billion 2017:682). It is critical that research of mining
communities and conflicts continue, in order to determine potential avenues to successful
decision-making processes (Conde and Le Billion 2017:693). By considering the social
and political landscape of the proposed PolyMet mine, the following research serves to
extend SLO literature and contribute suggestions for how to increase the utility of the
framework as a method of organizing and analyzing landscapes of public opinion
regarding environmental controversies.
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Case Study Background
Northeastern Minnesota is a land with many legacies. Typified by sprawling lake
and river systems that are punctuated by Lake Superior, the region is rich in water,
forests, and minerals. Many disparate groups have been drawn to the region for the
variety of natural resources available. Ojibwe tribes have been utilizing the wild rice,
maple syrup, and wealth of plants and animals native to the land for centuries. French
voyageurs trapped and hunted the region until the logging industry moved in. Once the
region was thoroughly logged the mining industry took over, having finally realized the
abundance of iron and copper. While various groups enjoyed the exploitation of these
resources for wealth and livelihood, in the 20th century a new contingent of resource users
began the process of protecting pieces of the Northwoods from extraction as wilderness
for recreation.
Understanding these intertwining legacies and their contribution to strong, placebased identities is critical when considering the proposed copper mines in the region
today and how they are perceived by different stakeholder groups. In this chapter I will
briefly discuss the recent histories of the region, including the Ojibwe legacy, extractive
industries in the region (e.g., mining, logging), and the introduction of environmental
regulation, in order to provide a context for PolyMet’s proposed NorthMet mine in the
region.
Lake Superior Bands of Ojibwe. During early European contact in the mid-17th
century, Northern Minnesota was home primarily to the Dakota and other Siouan-
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speaking tribes (Barr Engineering et al. 2012:41)1. In the late 16th and 17th century,
Algonquin-speaking Ojibwe2, or Chippewa, tribes began moving from the east coast,
likely near the Saint Lawrence River, to the Great Lakes region (Vennum 1978, Danziger
1990). By 1760, the Ojibwe controlled territory in Ontario, Quebec, Michigan,
Wisconsin, and Minnesota, maintaining a strong role in the regional fur trade. By 1800
Ojibwe tribes held exclusive control of northern Minnesota as the Dakota moved north,
south, and west of the area (Barr Engineering et al. 2012:43).
Ojibwe tribes in the region followed a traditional woodland cycle that included
maple sugaring in the spring, fishing and hunting small game in the summer, harvesting
wild rice in the fall, and hunting large game in the winter as a major part of their
livelihoods strategies (Danziger 1990:11). Due to the short growing season of northern
Minnesota and the relatively poor soil, plant gathering for food, medicine, and building
materials was critical to the Ojibwe (Barr Engineering et al. 2012:42). Such plants
included wild rice, spruce root, cedar and birch bark, sage, maple sap, hazelnuts,
blueberries, roots, and mushrooms (Barr Engineering et al. 2012:44). Tribes lived in
semi-permanent villages, generally located near wild rice habitat, and influenced the
vegetation in the region through selective harvesting and controlled burns (Barr
Engineering et al. 2012:40).

This references a cultural inventory that is cited throughout this thesis as “Barr Engineering et al.”
according to the ASA style guide. Though the reference is a bit misleading, this is a useful compilation of
data sourced from tribal and nontribal entities on both sides of the issue.
2
Ojibwe, Chippewa, and Anishinaabe are used throughout this work. Anishinaabe refers to the larger group
of indigenous tribes that speak Algonquin languages, which include the Ojibwe, among many others.
Ojibwe are indigenous people who traditionally speak Ojibwe, an Algonquin language, and ranged
historically in the northern Great Lakes region. They are the fifth largest native American group in the
United States. Chippewa is the anglicization of Ojibwe that is predominant in the United States.
1
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Known as Manoomin (which translates to “the food that grows on water”) in
Ojibwe, wild rice serves an important role in Ojibwe culture, and has therefore served as
a linchpin in conversations around conservation in the Great Lakes region3. Endemic to
lakes and slow rivers, wild rice was harvested in the fall and served as a food staple to
local tribes. With a lengthy storage life of up to ten years, wild rice was critical in the
harsh northern climate (Barr Engineering et al. 2012: 51). It has historically been an
economic and organizational centerpiece, dictating indigenous movement and settlement,
and used for trade (Keller 1978). Manoomin also plays an important spiritual role, used
ceremonially and holding a critical place in legends of place and formation.
As of 2008, over 2 million pounds of wild rice are harvested by members of
Ojibwe bands annually (Fletcher and Christin 2015:34). In 2007 wild rice provided more
than $400,000 in tribal revenue, speaking to its continued relevance both culturally and
economically (Fletcher and Christin 2015:34). There are 118 identified wild rice
locations in the St. Louis Watershed alone, and while many of these wild rice habitats
exist in ceded territory, the Ojibwe retain use rights in order to access this critical species
(Fletcher and Christin 2015:34).
The Lake Superior Chippewa ceded their territory along Lake Superior to the
United States government in the La Pointe Treaty of 1854 (see Figure 2), which
established approximately 100,000 acres for the Fond du Lac reservation (Treaty with the
Chippewa 1854, Fletcher and Christin 2015). The Fond du Lac reservation lies within the
St. Louis watershed, approximately 20 miles west of Duluth and adjacent to the small city
of Cloquet (Fletcher and Christin 2015:10). The La Pointe treaty explicitly grants the

3

Since 1973 Minnesota has had a water quality standard based around wild rice (10mg/L sulfate) under the
Clean Water Act
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Figure 2 - Map of Ojibwe land ceded in Treaty of 1854
Ojibwe rights to hunt, fish, and harvest from ceded territories (Treaty with the Chippewa,
1854). These treaty rights are classified as property rights under the U.S. Constitution and
include a governmental obligation to protect natural resources within these areas
(Thompson 2017:5).
Following a cultural inventory conducted by PolyMet in conjunction with the
Fond du Lac, Bois Fort, Grand Portage, and Bad River bands of Chippewa, a handful of
specific historically significant sites within the area of the proposed NorthMet mine have
been recognized by the State Historic Preservation Office. These include Spring Mine
Lake Sugarbush (a maple sugar camp), a portion of the Laurentian Divide that is
considered “culturally significant” to multiple Ojibwe bands, a portion of the trail
between Beaver Bay and Lake Vermillion, and multiple sites associated with the Erie
18

Mining Company (MDNR 2015:ES-40). These specific protections do not take into
account the potential environmental degradations (e.g., water quality) that could affect
tribal rights to land usage (e.g., wild rice harvest, maple sugar tapping, fishing, and
hunting). Bands of Ojibwe in Minnesota, especially the Fond du Lac band, have
vocalized criticism of the NorthMet project throughout the permitting process, citing
these rights and potential degradations.

Mining legacy of the Iron Range. Though the history of fur-trappers and
voyageur culture in the Great Lakes dates back to the 17th century (Nute 1930), the 1854
treaty opened up longer-term European settlement in the region. Agricultural ventures
were primarily small-scale, subsistence projects due to the harsh climate and lack of
transportation for market crops, but public land sales in 1875 and 1882 led to expansion
of the logging industry and construction of railroads throughout northern Minnesota (Barr
Engineering et al. 2012:88, Manuel 2015:xiii). While logging remained northern
Minnesota’s primary industry in the 19th century, prospectors began to emerge in the
region, searching for gold but instead discovering vast deposits of iron and copper
(Manual 2015).
Prospectors mapped the large iron deposits of the Vermilion and Mesabi Ranges
(two iron ranges collectively known as the Iron Range region of Minnesota) in the late
19th century (See Figure 3), which became increasingly valuable as sources for the
burgeoning steel industry became scarcer (Manuel 2015). Beginning in the 1880s, the
natural ore extraction in the region experienced a rapid boom that continued through the
early 20th century (Manuel 2015:15).
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Figure 3 - Map of the Mesabi and Vermilion Iron Ranges
Fears of resource depletion following the success of the massive open pit mines
helped spur experimentation with extracting iron from the endemic low-grade taconite
(Barr Engineering et al. 2012:93). By the 1950s and 60s, the long-feared decline of
natural ore was compounded by an unprecedented influx of iron from international
sources (Manuel 2015:49). The resulting job losses and rural flight served as an impetus
for many workers to support what became known as the 1964 Taconite bill, providing a
tax break to mining companies that made it economical for them to open new taconite
mines in the region (Manuel 2015:63).
Since the early 20th century, the Iron Range has been typified by boom and bust
cycles centered on the taconite mining industry (Manual 2015). Boom cycles were
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characterized by vibrant communities, which the mining companies helped sustain
directly through jobs, and indirectly through the subsequent support for businesses and
schools in the region (Kojola 2018:377). Bust cycles were associated with struggling
businesses and schools, difficulty for residents to find sustainable employment, and the
need to move elsewhere to find work (Kojola 2018:377). Bob Dylan, who hailed from the
Iron Range town of Hibbing, MN, concludes the song North Country Blues with a bleak
description of an Iron Range bust town in the 1950s where, “The summer is gone, the
ground’s turning cold / The stores one by one they’re all folding / My children will go as
soon as they grow / Well, there ain’t nothing here now to hold them” (Dylan 1964).
Current decline in the mining industry of the region, due in part to the globalization and
increased mechanization of the mining industry, has resulted in current high levels of
unemployment and population loss that hark back to these earlier bust cycles.
Along with a legacy of mining comes a legacy of pollution, which has generally
increased with the shift towards taconite mining. The taconite industry, while allowing
mining to continue as an economic linchpin on the Iron Range, produces significantly
more tailings4 as a byproduct than natural ore. Taconite, as a lower grade ore, is made up
of only 22% iron, meaning that the remaining 78% must be stored or dumped somewhere
as tailings (Manuel 2015:88).
By the end of the 19th century, industrial mining companies had come to
understand that water pollution was a concern and generally worked to carefully plan and
recycle water supplies (Manuel 2015:89). Neither the mining companies nor the

4

Tailings refer to the waste material generated in mining. Tailings are generally in slurry form with a mudlike consistency. They include ground rock and any substances generated in the mining process, (e.g.,
water, heavy metals, minerals, and chemicals).
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government regulators yet understood the full ecological repercussions of improperly
stored mine tailings, however. An extreme example of a common practice of the time was
Reserve Mining Company’s project on the North Shore, which from 1955 to 1980
dumped the equivalent of about 67,000 tons of tailings per day directly into Lake
Superior (Manuel 2015:89). This dumping was fully permitted, and the mining company
operated under the belief that at the bottom of Lake Superior the tailings “would be out of
sight forever and posterity would not have to cope with them” (Manuel 2015:90).
Tailings were considered more in terms of a waste product to be hidden from sight than a
potentially toxic mass that could spread to pollute nearby communities.
In the late 20th century this widespread failure to account for environmental
degradation as the result of mining was federally curtailed. Beginning with the Water
Pollution Control Act (1948), more stringent water protection acts followed, including
the Water Quality Act (1965), the Clean Water Act (1972), the Safe Drinking Water Act
(1974), and a revised Clean Water Act (1977) (Manuel 2015:93). The Environmental
Protection Industry (EPA) was established in 1970 in the midst of a national-level
watershed moment regarding environmental pollution.
In 1987, the EPA identified the St. Louis watershed – including the Iron Range
towns of Hibbing and Virginia, the Fond du Lac Reservation, and Duluth and spills into
Lake Superior – as a “Great Lakes Area of Concern,” particularly for its high mercury
levels (Fletcher and Christin 2015:20). Mining acts as the largest source of mercury
emissions in Lake Superior, leading to bioaccumulation in fish, wildlife, and humans
(Fletcher and Christin 2015:20). A study published in 2011 found that approximately
10% of newborns in the region have what is considered an unusually high level of
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mercury in their bloodstream, likely due to their mother’s consumption of Lake Superior
fish (Fletcher and Christin 2015:21).
The proposed NorthMet site is located in the St. Louis watershed, upstream of the
Partridge and Embarrass Rivers. This means that tailings, should there be any technical
failure, would ultimately flow into Lake Superior (see Figure 4). Testing done during

Figure 4 - Map of the St. Louis Watershed
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NorthMet’s environmental review process has indicated that all of the waters downstream
of the mine site are already in excess of water quality standards for mercury per the Great
Lakes initiative (Maccabee 2009:1146).
The legacy of mining on the Iron Range has caused rifts in the population
concerning community development and economic strategies in light of the decline of the
iron and taconite industries. Some residents argue for a maintenance of industrial mining,
expanding and continuing operations through boom and bust cycles, and embracing
mining as a big piece of residents’ place-based identity (Manuel 2015:163, Kojola
2018:376). Others call for a re-imagining of the region in terms of “industrial nostalgia,”
turning the long history of mining into an economic strategy to draw tourists to the
region, while ultimately moving into a post-extractive economic strategy for the Iron
Range (Manuel 2015:163).
Tourist industry in northern Minnesota. Non-mining industries, especially
tourism and recreation focused on the lakes and wilderness of the region, have emerged
in the 20th and 21st centuries as key pieces of economic strategy in northern Minnesota.
Such industries rely on intact ecosystems for continued success, though the size of the
industries varies from community to community. Duluth, Minnesota, for example, boasts
an annual 3.5 million visitors (Duluth Area Chamber of Commerce 2018), many of
whom use the hub as a stopover for trips up the shore of Lake Superior or into the Iron
Range and Boundary Waters areas. Water contamination at the top of the St. Louis
watershed could potentially have a serious impact on the tourist industry and the income
of many northern Minnesota residents who rely on the tourism and recreation industries
as a livelihoods strategy.
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Though not within the St. Louis watershed, the nearby Boundary Waters
Wilderness Area (BWCA) has been a large part of the discussion surrounding proposed
copper mining in Minnesota. The Boundary Waters Canoe Area, officially established
under the Wilderness Act of 1964, includes over 1,000,000 acres of forests and lakes
along 199 miles of the Minnesota-Canadian border (Dvorak et al. 2012:2). The BWCA,
which includes nearly 450,000 acres of surface water, was expanded and given additional
protections (including logging prohibitions, a mining protection area, and heavily
curtailing motor usage) in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978
(Dvorak et al. 2012:2). It is the largest wilderness area east of the Mississippi River and
the most visited wilderness area in the United States (Dvorak et al. 2012:2), with
approximately 143,300 visitors reported in 2015 (Hjerpe 2018:64).
Iron Range communities attract fewer annual visitors than the North Shore (i.e.,
the Minnesota shore of Lake Superior) and the BWCA, though tourism remains an
important component of the economy, with a range of historical mining and logging
museums and site tours, as well as traditional outdoor recreation offerings such as
extensive trail systems and lakes (Iron Range Tourism Bureau 2019). Residents of these
communities with a strong mining legacy often consider tourists as “outsiders—wealthy
urban liberals—who want to preserve their wilderness playground and dictate how local
communities—insiders—use the land” (Kojola 2019:375). As we shall see in the
following case study, this tension between land users comes to a head when
environmental regulation and permits for extraction are up for discussion.
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PolyMet’s Proposed NorthMet Project. PolyMet, originally named Fleck
Resources Ltd., was incorporated in Canada in the early 1980s and first leased mineral
rights in the Duluth Complex from U.S. Steel in 1989. In 2005 PolyMet began their first
steps towards opening NorthMet (see Figure 5), a proposed sulfide ore copper-nickel
(SOCN), or hard-rock, mine that would be the first of its kind in Minnesota. The
proposed NorthMet site would be primarily located on a brownfield5 site previously
mined by LTV Steel Mining Company (LTVSMC). Along with the land, PolyMet
acquired infrastructure from LTVSMC, including a railroad line, tailings pit, and rock
crushing facility, which they intend to repurpose for proposed mining operations
(Hoffmeister 2019:4).
First proposed in 2013, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (MDNR)
finalized a land exchange between PolyMet and the United States Forest Service (USFS)
in 2018 amidst public controversy. PolyMet provided approximately 6,700 acres of
private forest land for approximately 6,650 acres of land located in the Superior National
Forest (MNDNR 2015:ES-31). Prior to the exchange, PolyMet owned subsurface mineral
rights for the USFS land, while the USFS held surface rights (Hoffmeister 2019:6).
By 2015 MDNR completed their final Environmental Impact Statement and in
2017 PolyMet submitted their Permit to Mine application to MDNR. In order to begin
mining operations, sixteen permits are required from the Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources (DNR), the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), and the
Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) (Minnesota DNR 2018). By March 2019,

5

A brownfield site is loosely defined as an area that has been previously developed but is no longer in use
(Alker 2000). Environmental groups have contested the use of this term for the NorthMet site, as it
implicitely devalues the land as a no longer a functioning ecological system, implying that future
development would not contribute to re-degradation
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PolyMet had received the necessary permits from the DNR (including Permit to Mine,
Wetland Replacement Plan, Water Appropriation, Dam Safety, Endangered Species
Taking Permit, and Permit for Work in Public Waters), MPCA (including air emission
permit, water quality permit, and 401 certification), and the Army Corps of Engineers (a
wetlands permit) (Minnesota DNR 2019).
Environmental groups such as WaterLegacy, Friends of the Boundary Waters
Wilderness, and the Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy, as well as the Fond
du Lac band of Chippewa, have been waging a multi-pronged battle on the social and
legal fronts since PolyMet first proposed permits in 2009 (WaterLegacy 2009). Their
appeals have focused on the value of natural resources in the region both for recreation
and indigenous livelihoods, human health and issues of clean water and mercury-free
fish, and the global legacy of mines extracting profits from mining ventures and then
absconding to leave residents and taxpayers with the resulting cleanup.
As of September 2019, three major permits had been stayed by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals pending official review. In June, the court issued a stay on the water
quality permit issued by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), citing
irregularities in communication between the EPA and MPCA that could reflect a desire to
keep EPA comments criticizing NorthMet private (MPR 2019). In August, the same court
issued stays on PolyMet’s permit to mine and dam safety permits (MPR 2019).
In January 2020 the Minnesota Court of Appeals officially reversed the two dam
permits and PolyMet’s permit to mine. A week later trial began in the Ramsey County
District Court to determine whether the communication irregularities between the MPCA
and EPA constituted deliberate obfuscation of the EPA’s concerns over the
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environmental effects of the proposed NorthMet mine. The case was brought against the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and PolyMet Mining, Inc. by Center for Biological
Diversity, Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Minnesota Center for
Environmental Advocacy, WaterLegacy, and Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior.

Abridged NorthMet Permit Timeline
2005 – Scoping Environmental Assessment Worksheet (EAW)
2008 – Switzerland-based corporation Glencore invests in PolyMet (owning between 25 and
40%)
2009 – DNR completes draft EIS
2013 – DNR completes supplemental Draft EIS to respond to comments, add changes to the
project, and include a land exchange with the USFS.
2015 – Minnesota DNR completes Final EIS of NorthMet Project and opens the public
commenting period.
2017 – PolyMet submits Permit to Mine application to Minnesota DNR.
Feb 2018 – WaterLegacy submits objections to PolyMet’s Permit to Mine application and
Petitions for a Contested Case Hearing
June 2018 – PolyMet finishes 6700-acre land exchange with USFS. WaterLegacy and
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy have filed a lawsuit against the
exchange.
June 2018 – Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, Minnesota Center for
Environmental Advocacy, and the Center for Biological Diversity request a
supplementary EIS. The DNR denied this request
July 2018 – WaterLegacy initiates a request for a supplementary EIS. The DNR denies this
request
Nov. 2018 – DNR issues permits for NorthMet.
Dec. 2018 – MPCA issues air and water permits
March 2019 – US Army Corps of Engineers issues final wetlands permit for NorthMet
project
June 2019 – MN Court of Appeals issues stay on PolyMet’s water quality permit
Aug 2019 – MN Court of Appeals issues stay on PolyMet’s permit to mine and dam safety
permit
Jan 2020 – MN Court of Appeals reverses two dam permits and PolyMet’s permit to mine
Jan 2020 – Ramsey County District Court begins trial over potential MPCA misconduct
Feb 2020 – Minnesota DNR submits petition to Minnesota Supreme Court requesting review
of January 2020 decision to overturn three DNR-issued permits
Figure 5 - Abridged timeline of the NorthMet permitting process 2005 - Mar 2020
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Framing the Case Study
Current permit reversals and litigation over transparency demonstrates the ability
of stakeholders to leverage public opinion to delay or halt PolyMet’s mining project.
Campaigns by environmental groups who have led the lawsuits against both PolyMet and
regulatory agencies have served to inform and mobilize the public to gain traction by
forcing the issue into local, regional, and national media and political platforms. In the
following research I consider data sources throughout the permitting process to look at
the struggle to mobilize public opinion and where points of tension remain between
various stakeholders and the mining company using the concept of social license to
operate to frame the case study. Considering the strategies both pro-mining and
environmental groups have used in an attempt to sway public opinion, analyzing public
comments, and conducting interviews, this research frames the NorthMet controversy
using a social license to operate model to discuss public perceptions of PolyMet and the
mine itself.
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PURPOSE & METHODOLOGY
In this chapter I detail the methods implemented to meet each of my research
outcomes, including basic analytical frameworks, how I narrowed my focus, and my
choice of using a case study method. I then detail the public comments on the Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), including their initial DNR coding, and how I
selected samples and coded a selection of the public comments. Next, I discuss my use of
semi-structured interviews, including how participants were selected and their
demographics. Finally, I briefly discuss the limitations of this research and my own
personal bias as a researcher on the issue.
Research Goals
In this research I use a case study method in order to answer the following
questions — How are rhetorical strategies operationalized by PolyMet and WaterLegacy
in an effort to influence public opinion about the NorthMet project? What does a
consideration of the NorthMet controversy using the framework of social license shed
light on in terms of how various stakeholders perceive the issue? What does the SLO
framework leave out and what changes need to be made to this theory as it is adopted by
scholars to make it a comprehensive framework? In order to address these questions, this
thesis works towards the following three outcomes:

1. To identify and describe the rhetorical strategies utilized by PolyMet and
WaterLegacy, who serve as two of the most vocal players in the NorthMet
controversy, in order to obtain or stall an informal social license to operate from
community, regional, and national stakeholders.
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While many individuals and stakeholder groups have taken an active role in the
public debate surrounding NorthMet, I have identified PolyMet and WaterLegacy as two
of the most prominent, and polarized, to study. WaterLegacy is a Minneapolis-based nonprofit that was founded in 2009 specifically to “counter the threat of sulfide mining
proposed for Northern Minnesota” (WaterLegacy 2019). Their focus has been elevating
the issue into the public sphere, educating and mobilizing the public to take action against
the proposed mines (including PolyMet and Twin Metals), and working on anti-mining
litigation to slow or halt the permitting process.
In considering the strategies that both pro-mining and environmental groups use
to sway public opinion, I look at their web presence (e.g., websites, social media activity,
community engagement) of PolyMet and WaterLegacy and their supporters. I also
consider opinion pieces and news articles published in local media outlets and how they
frame and construct the controversy. Using a blend of the rhetorical frameworks laid out
by Hamilton and Lange (regarding the radium-mine cleanup and the spotted owl debate
respectively) and paying particular attention to the use of technical versus cultural
rationality, I analyze the public discourse of the NorthMet debate.

2. To explore where and for what reason social license to operate has been granted
or withheld for the NorthMet project among different stakeholder groups.
I will consider social license to operate in terms of the factors presented in social
license to operate literature (Boutilier and Thomson 2011, Koivurova et al. 2015, and
others), including legitimacy, credibility, and trust. In order to determine the extent to
which SLO for NorthMet has been achieved, I look to the extensive public comments on
the final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and eight semi-structured interviews
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with various stakeholders. Because the list of stakeholders is so extensive, for the purpose
of this case study I necessarily limited the research scope. While randomly sampled
public comments may include anyone who chose to participate in the commenting period,
when considering opinion-editorials and seeking interviewees I narrowed the stakeholder
groups to non-tribal residents of the Arrowhead Region of Minnesota (including the Iron
Range, Ely, and Duluth). The research scope and the resulting exclusion of certain voices
in the controversy is further articulated in the limitations section of this chapter.

3. To situate this Minnesota case study within the already existing social license to
operate literature, use this case study to extend previous research, and note
strengths and weaknesses of the SLO framework when applied to this case study on
the proposed NorthMet mine.
Through analysis of data gathered from public comments on the final EIS and
interviews with members of identified stakeholder groups, I engage with the existing
body of literature around social license to operate and public process. I will compare my
findings to case studies conducted in other communities engaging with proposed mining
projects to find similarities and discrepancies and comment on the utility of the SLO
framework in providing analysis and potential feedback or recommendations regarding
public perceptions on their ability to affect change. Through this case study, located
within a specific context in space and time, I will implement what Burawoy (1998) refers
to as reflexive science, using the specific to speak back to the theory, and “reduce the
effects of power” (i.e., domination, silencing, objectification, and normalization) by
painting a landscape of multiple stakeholders in the issue (Burawoy 1998:30).
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Coined by the mining industry as a means of capturing the general necessity of
public support to ensure the success of a particular project, the concept of a social license
to operate has been operationalized by academics to consider the integration of
stakeholder opinions in decision-making regarding extractive projects. Using this
framework in an analysis of the proposed NorthMet copper-nickel mine in northern
Minnesota, the following research helps extend this increasing body of literature and
address limitations of the SLO framework as a stand-alone model.

Data Sources & Collection
This study considers a broad pool of data, including websites, op-eds, public
comments, and semi-structured interviews. This diversity of data sources allows for a
richer consideration of rhetorical strategies and their pervasiveness or visibility in how
various individuals perceive the proposed NorthMet mine. Sources such as websites and
online op-eds served to help define rhetorical strategies utilized to help frame the debate
from both sides of the issue. Consideration of public comments allowed insight into
which rhetorical strategies took root and are reflected in how people think about and
publicly respond to the issue, considering the broad group of stakeholders that chose to
participate. Including semi-structured interviews allowed for a narrowing of stakeholder
views by considering voices of individuals geographically located within the region of
the proposed NorthMet mine and allowed for more informality, bringing greater depth to
the consideration of rhetorical strategies and how they are reflected using the social
license to operate framework. While web data was gathered by combing PolyMet and
WaterLegacy’s websites, I implemented more formal collection strategy for public
comments and semi-structured interviews, which is detailed below.
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Public Comments
The Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) on the proposed NorthMet
mine and the land exchange was made available to the public on November 9, 2015 and
the public comment period was open through December 21, 2015. A total of 30,441
public comments were submitted by 24,969 different commenters. Comments ranged
from single sentence submissions to over one hundred pages. Each comment was
identified by a sequential submission number based on the order in which it was received.
A total of 29,648 (97%) of the comments received were form letters. The DNR
identified 9 different form letter sources and tallied the number of submissions that
included each form letter (see Appendix A). Form letter submissions were categorized as
form letter non-variants (i.e., the form letter was submitted without any significant
alterations by the commenter) or form letter variants (i.e., the form letter was altered or
supplemented substantially by the commenter). Of the form letter submissions, 388 were
categorized as form letter variants and 29,260 were categorized as form letter nonvariants. There were 793 comments labeled as unique submissions (i.e., comments that
did not rely on form letters but were completely composed by the commenter), which
made up 3% of the total comments received (MNDNR et al. 2016:6).
The DNR identified 27 issues in public comments on the FEIS and used these as
codes to organize the comments received. A full list of DNR codes is available in
Appendix B. One shortcoming of this coding system is that while full comments were cut
so that sections could be assigned to different codes, cut sections were not assigned more
than one code. This means that a selected sentence that addressed the land exchange,
vegetation, and financial assurance would only be coded within the “most relevant” of
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these sections (MNDNR et al. 2016:7). Coding comments under one topic and not the
others could effectively downplay certain issues and make it more difficult to find all of
the comments that address a certain concern with the proposed NorthMet mine.
Unique and form-variant submissions are publicly available via the Minnesota
DNR website in their coded form (i.e., submissions were split up into sections and
organized by codes). In order to select comments for analysis, I first put the names of
everyone who had submitted unique or form variant letters in an Excel spreadsheet. Then,
using a random number generator, I selected 100 submitters and extracted all of the
pieces of their comments from the DNR coded document. There were 1181 comments
labeled as unique or form variants, meaning I analyzed 8.5% of those comments.
I coded comments based on topic and theme, and comments could be coded
within multiple categories. Of the 100 sampled comments, 12 were in favor of the mine
being permitted, 84 were against the mine being permitted, and four did not take a stance
on the mine going forward but did point out changes that should be made in the
regulation of the mine. Public comments included the name of the commenter and the
option to include an associated organization. Only 5 of the 100 comments I analyzed
included an associated organization, though 2 others included an associated business or
organization within the comment itself. Because this was the only available
identification, apart from occasional geographical or personal markers (i.e., “I live off the
Gunflint trail” or “I work at an outfitters”), it was difficult to identify commenters as
members of specific stakeholder groups with certainty.
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Semi-Structured Interviews
I conducted in-person interviews in northern Minnesota during February 2020.
Additionally, I had two informal conversations in December 2019 (one with a member of
a major environmental organization based in the Twin Cities and the other with an aide
for a politician who serves on the state energy council and has watched as the PolyMet
issue develops politically). These conversations helped tune me in to critical aspects of
the issue and solidify the importance of speaking with residents of the Arrowhead region
outside of larger organizations and political structures in order to understand how the
machinations of larger institutions (e.g., unions, politicians, governmental groups, and
mining companies) affected those who lived full-time in northern Minnesota.
I selected participants using a combination of purposive and snowball sampling,
with the goal of speaking to residents in different parts of the Arrowhead region and
across the spectrum of the issue. When contacting organizations, I specifically reached
out to smaller organizations or organizational chapters located within northern Minnesota
rather than those primarily based in the Twin Cities or nationally. Initial contacts were
found using a combination of organizations listed in the public comments, individuals
associated with organizations who contributed multiple op-eds to local papers, and some
savvy google searches.
I initially sent 24 email requests for interviews and received seven replies. Four of
these replies indicated that the individual was not willing to participate or asked for
further information (e.g., intent, bias) but did not lead to acceptance of the interview
request. All four of these emails were from individuals who held public office and were
concerned about participation regardless of assurances of anonymity.
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I set up two meetings with small organizations on either side of the issue before
arriving in northern Minnesota. I set up a third meeting via email with an organizer who
was not specifically involved in the PolyMet issue but focused on other sustainability
issues within the Iron Range and larger northern Minnesota community and had the
unique perspective of maintaining professional neutrality on the issue due to its
divisiveness. After building rapport with these initial contacts, I asked them if there were
other folks I should reach out to and gained another short list of contacts.
In total I conducted seven interviews with eight people, who are publicly vocal
about the issue and have participated in the permitting process in some way (e.g.,
attended town halls, submitted public comments a version of the EIS). In two of the
interviews, an additional person (either relative or friend) joined partway through our
conversation and would occasionally add their own comments but did not actively
participate in the interview. Interview locations were selected by the interviewees. Six
interviews were held in cafes and the seventh was held in an office associated with a
small organization run by the interviewee.
One participant lived in Duluth, one lived in Cloquet, four lived in the larger Ely
area, and two lived in Cook. I spoke with three women and five men and seven of the
eight were age 50 or older. Two participants worked directly in the mining industry
during their career, one was a carpenter who worked closely with the mining industry,
one worked for the DNR, one worked for multiple environmental organizations, one
works for a small sustainability-focused nonprofit, one was a lawyer, and one was a
homemaker whose husband worked in the taconite mines. Ultimately, four participants
were in favor of PolyMet and four were against it, with varying levels of conviction.
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Participants were informed that their names and identities would not be shared
and asked for consent to record the interview. Before the conversations began, I asked if
participants had questions for me. I asked this again at the end of the interview to
maintain transparency. While many participants were at first wary to talk to me, or had a
specific agenda that they were prepared to present to me, most were surprised and
interested by the direction of my questions towards particular experiences and feelings,
rather than focusing on the debate itself or coming to a value judgement about the
PolyMet mine. This allowed me to build rapport and contributed to the success of using
snowball sampling methods as most interviews ended with the interviewee asking, “had I
talked to so-and-so yet,” and sharing their contact information with me.
A copy of the interview guide can be found in Appendix C. While this guide
served to direct the conversation, it was not followed verbatim in every interview, and
each conversation included departures from the questions outlined in the guide based on
the participant’s interests and experiences. Questions were focused on what issues remain
pressing regarding the NorthMet project (and if this has changed since the final EIS and
the permitting process), levels of trust in PolyMet, environmental advocacy groups, and
the DNR, the legitimacy of the project, whether stakeholders feel like their needs are
being heard and met, what they see as shortcomings in the review and permitting process,
how the debate over PolyMet has affected community dynamics, and what sort of a
future they would like to see for the region. The focus of the interview was based on
takeaways from analyzing the public comments, including the need to get deeper into
issues of trust, the need to obtain an updated temporal picture of the issue, and the need to
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broaden the scope of the analysis beyond just the mining operation to include more
governmental dynamics and affects that this issue has had on Iron Range residents.

Limitations & Personal Bias
When I began this research, I had a grand plan to create a thick description case
study of the PolyMet controversy that included deep consideration of all stakeholder
groups. As my research progressed, I realized that such lofty schemes were not possible
within the limitations of this particular master’s thesis in terms of time, location, and
status as outsider.
Originally, I had hoped to include tribal interviews as Ojibwe narratives are a
critical piece of any discussion of the St. Louis watershed, and particularly regarding
NorthMet, which would at the headwaters of the Saint Louis River, upstream of the Fond
du Lac reservation. Additionally, members of the Fond du Lac band have been vocal
participants in conversations around NorthMet throughout the past fifteen years,
including official statements, participation in the cultural landscape study conducted by
PolyMet, and pushing through anti-mining litigation.
As I began to lay plans for this research, however, I discovered that I would need
to go through an additional tribal IRB process and potentially rebuild my research
questions and analytical frameworks. This type of participant-driven research to elevate
indigenous experiences and perspectives is extremely important. Unfortunately, due to
personal time constraints and location hundreds of miles away from the indigenous
communities that I needed to have important conversations and build trust and rapport

39

with, I chose to narrow my scope to communities that were more readily accessible to
me, as an outsider.
I grew up in Minneapolis, MN and spent a significant amount of time skipping
stones in Lake Superior, camping in the Iron Range, cross-country skiing in Ely, and
canoeing through the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. As an adult I have continued this
tradition and treasure the weeks I get to spend in the north country each year. I also have
a background in environmentalism and come from a graduate program that is rooted in
environmentalism. It is important to note that, while I strive to present a full picture of the
landscape of opinions surrounding NorthMet, I carry personal biases and a strong
emotional attachment to place and a desire to see an equitable outcome.
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RESULTS & DISCUSSION
The following chapter considers three major sources of data, including the digital
presentation of PolyMet and WaterLegacy, a random sampling of 100 public comments
on the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) from 2015, and eight semi-structured
interviews with residents of the Arrowhead region conducted in February 2020. The
chapter is organized as a sort of call and response, where the first section focuses on how
two of the larger organizations on either side of the issue – PolyMet and WaterLegacy –
have utilized rhetorical strategies in how they have presented the issue of the NorthMet
mine to the public, and how their presentation of the issue serves as an attempt to attain
or undermine public support of the NorthMet project. The second portion of this chapter
focuses on public perceptions of the mine, framed in terms of social license to operate.
Considered together, these sections help illustrate which aspects of the issue prove
critical in terms of social license, and where rhetorical strategies have been successful or
not, in that they are reflected in the way that individuals make decisions about the issue. I
conclude this chapter with a discussion of community dynamics and the limitations of the
SLO framework in capturing these types of complexities surrounding the issue.

Rhetorical Strategies and the Struggle for Public Support
Rhetorical strategies of both pro-mining and anti-mining groups can be
considered in terms of attempting to achieve or deter a social license to operate from
those affected by the proposed project. The social license to operate framework accounts
for the use of rhetorical strategies not only to affect the official, governmental permitting
process, but to affect public opinion amongst stakeholders.
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In the following section, I will outline rhetorical strategies utilized by PolyMet in
an effort to achieve SLO, as well as strategies implemented by prominent environmental
activists to keep SLO from being achieved. In considering these strategies I will look
primarily at both PolyMet and WaterLegacy’s web presence – including individual
websites, fact sheets, and recordings of speeches – as well as opinion and news pieces
published in local media outlets. My analysis of the issue of sulfide ore copper nickel
(SOCN) mining in Minnesota will consider the rhetorical strategies of both PolyMet and
WaterLegacy, using Hamilton’s basic framework while speaking back to Lange’s study
of the spotted owl debate. I will consider how both sides implement rhetorical strategies
to (1) define the issue, emphasizing what is included and what is left out through their
respective definitions and framings of the landscape (2) identify themselves, including
how they distance themselves from opposing groups through vilification and ennobling
and build relationships with stakeholders, and (3) create boundaries around the issue
(e.g., in space and time), thereby electing what is included in the controversy and what is
obscured. By considering how PolyMet and WaterLegacy each engage in these three
strategies, I will explore how they attempt to sway public opinion and gain or stall SLO
for the NorthMet mine. Determining whether or not SLO has been achieved is not within
the scope of this study, but the following analysis will set the stage for future research
focusing on stakeholder perspectives regarding PolyMet’s NorthMet project that can
better speak to the ultimate successes and failures of these strategies.
Defining the Issue
The disparate ways that pro-mining and environmental groups define the issue of
NorthMet begin with how they name the type of mining PolyMet has proposed in
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northern Minnesota. Pro-mining interests refer to the proposed NorthMet project as a
“copper-nickel mine,” emphasizing the precious earth metals that would be extracted as a
result of the project. WaterLegacy and other environmental groups refer to NorthMet and
similar proposed projects as “sulfide mines,” highlighting the toxic acid-mine drainage
that would result from such projects. Each serves to define the mining project based on a
specific part of the mining process, while excluding the other (i.e., “copper-nickel mine”
does not speak to the risks involved while “sulfide mine” does not acknowledge the
benefits).
By emphasizing the precious metals that will be mined through NorthMet,
PolyMet chooses to define their project within the context of maintaining the status quo,
including modern, technological lifestyles comprised of cell phones, computers, and
televisions, while promoting sustainable development of “green technologies” such as
hybrid cars and wind turbines. Asserting that, “our lifestyles – and the shift towards a
sustainable future – rely on the responsible and safe extraction of metals,” PolyMet points
out that 35% of our copper and gold are imported and the United States only has one
active nickel mine (PolyMet 2018). The proposed copper-nickel mine, then, is not only
necessary to maintain the current technological age and increase sustainability, but
critical to the United States’ self-sufficiency and national economic development.
PolyMet defines the issue not only as a national need for precious earth metals,
but as a strategy to move away from the economic depression due to the decline of the
historic Iron Range mining industry. The banner on their main web page says, “Welcome
to the Next Generation of Mining in Minnesota,” speaking to a preservation of mining as
a historic way of life (PolyMet 2018). The website is rife with images of happy people
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hard at work, emphasizing the ability of the NorthMet project to provide much-needed
careers in the region. They highlight the number of jobs and construction hours, as well
as the “$515 million-dollar annual boost to St. Louis County Economy” (PolyMet 2018).
In a header on their website, PolyMet posits that they are “breathing life into an idle
plant” (PolyMet 2018). This headline alludes to their assertions that they are building on
an old taconite mine brownfield site (i.e., a piece of land that is already degraded due to
previous development) and making use of already existing mining infrastructure. Use of
the term “idle” also bolsters their definition of the issue as putting an idle community
back to work.
WaterLegacy challenges the assertion that more copper-nickel mines are required
to meet demand for precious earth metals, claiming that if copper recycling were
bolstered in the United States, an adequate amount copper could be recommissioned for
technological projects (WaterLegacy2016). They also emphasize non-mining economies
on the Iron Range, especially tourism and recreation, which rely on an intact ecosystem
for continued success. Duluth, Minnesota boasts an annual 3.5 million visitors (Duluth
Area Chamber of Commerce 2018), many of whom use the hub as a stopover for trips up
the shore of Lake Superior or into the Iron Range and Boundary Waters areas. Water
contamination that could result from a failure in NorthMet’s infrastructure would have a
serious impact on the tourist industry and the income of many northern Minnesota
residents who rely on the tourism and recreation industries as a livelihoods strategy.
In 2018, WaterLegacy led a film crew on a canoe trip into the area where PolyMet
plans to build NorthMet’s mining infrastructure. By including film that highlights the
beauty of a recuperating, functioning landscape they defined the issue not as the further
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development of a brownfield site, but as the re-degradation of a recovering ecosystem
(WaterLegacy 2018). By emphasizing the importance of intact ecosystems for outdoor
recreation without addressing the call for more skilled labor in the region, they fail to
address the fact that jobs in the recreation industry generally pay less than those in the
mining industry. Furthermore, much of the Iron Range has not yet successfully entered
the recreation industry and the majority of tourism is focused on the shores of Lake
Superior and the BWCA.
For environmental groups, the issue is not about the economy or job production,
but about a threat against water, human health, and cultural traditions. WaterLegacy
describes their mission as “protect[ing] Minnesota’s clean waters and the communities
that rely on them, particularly from the threat of sulfide mining pollution” (WaterLegacy
2018). They emphasize that many health organizations (including the Minnesota Nurses
Association, the Minnesota Public Health Association, and Minnesota Medical
Association, Minnesota Academy of Family Physicians) and tribal groups have requested
additional risk assessments that focus on potential effects on human health (WaterLegacy
2018). They also emphasize the fact that all such requests have been denied by the DNR,
expanding the issue to include failures in the regulatory process.
For PolyMet, the issue of potential environmental degradation is a technical issue,
and they choose to define and address it in terms of technical rationality. PolyMet asserts
that “by meeting Minnesota’s strict environmental standards, and with today’s modern
mining techniques and processes, we can mine the metals we need every day safely and
responsibly” (PolyMet 2018). Their definition of the issue implies that the failures of past
mining ventures were a result of technical failures and minimal environmental standards
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that have been overcome through increased regulation and scientific know-how. This is
reinforced in their response to criticism from environmental groups after the 2019 failure
of the Córrego do Feijão mine in Brazil, that has led to a ban of upstream tailings dams in
the country (Arneson 2019):
Our tailings basin… remained one of the most studied aspects of the entire
NorthMet Project during its 14-year environmental review and permitting
process. Its design was reviewed extensively by independent, international
experts during environmental review and by different experts hired by the
state during the permitting. The dam was found to meet or exceed every
factor of safety for dam stability. Further, requirements imposed by the
Dam Safety Permit and Permit to Mine and agreed to by PolyMet far
exceed the standards set forth in the Minnesota Rules (PolyMet 2019).
This claim both establishes the scientific integrity of the NorthMet plans, as well
the willingness of PolyMet to work towards not only meeting but exceeding legal
standards.
PolyMet’s emphasis on a lengthy and rigorous permitting process, greenlighting by outside technical “experts,” and extensive regulation speaks to their
privileging of technical rationality when it comes to the safety of the NorthMet
project. The Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy called the permitting
of NorthMet a “$1 billion gamble for Minnesota taxpayers,” emphasizing both the
risk and the level of unknowns despite PolyMet’s appeal to technical rationality
(Kraker 2018).

Identification
Both sides of the NorthMet debate seek to identify themselves, and their
opponents, by placing their organization within the community and forming relationships
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with other groups that help bolster their identification. While the Arrowhead region is
made up of a number of diverse communities, broad references to “community” help
construct an image of the Iron Range as a place where residents together make up a single
cohesive community, masking the complexities of the issue and brushing over the
divergent wants and needs of different communities within the region.
PolyMet promotes itself as a member of the larger Arrowhead community,
asserting on their website that “Minnesota is our home. We care deeply about our people,
our communities and our environment” (PolyMet 2018). By using “we” and “our”
continually throughout their campaign they seek to normalize their status as a part of the
Iron Range community. This construction of community also helps simplify PolyMet’s
identification as a community member without taking sides, positing themselves as a
stakeholder that is not just an extractive industry giant from away, but a company with a
vested interest in the well-being of regional communities and environment of northern
Minnesota. Indeed, they posit themselves as “environmental stewards,” wielding
“modern mining techniques to protect Minnesota’s natural resources for years to come”
(PolyMet 2018).
While PolyMet repeatedly speaks to the benefits of extraction and advancement in
mining technology, they are careful to promote themselves as environmentally-minded, at
one point even describing the metals mined on the Iron Range as “the silent rivers that
have run through the northern Minnesota economy since the late 1800s” (PolyMet 2018).
The use of a “silent river” as a metaphor is telling because the image implies a pristine
waterway, which is in stark contrast to the contaminated watershed predicted by
environmental groups. PolyMet’s choice of imagery throughout their website and
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promotional materials is also firmly rooted in environmentalism, including not only
photographs of pristine riparian areas as they describe plans for reclamation, but an image
of a larch branch when describing their final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
publication.
PolyMet’s identification goes beyond imagery and self-promotion to include
emphasizing key regional partnerships that help contribute to how they may be perceived
by stakeholders. One project that is highlighted on their website is a collaboration with
Ducks Unlimited – an outdoor sports based wetlands and waterfowl conservation group –
to work on their Living Lakes Initiative project, with the goal of conserving Minnesota
wetlands that serve as critical wild rice habitat (PolyMet 2018). By emphasizing their
partnerships with conservation groups, PolyMet extends their identification to include
environmental conservation and recreation. Their involvement in preserving wild rice
specifically, which is a culturally significant plant to the Lake Superior bands of Ojibwe
and has a long history of controversy, serves to ally themselves at least peripherally with
the tribes. Through their environmental language, imagery, and advocacy, PolyMet seeks
establish itself as part of the natural landscape of northern Minnesota, rather than as the
polluter that anti-mining groups present them as.
PolyMet extends its identification as a member of the regional community beyond
textual claims by speaking to future job-creation and tangible contributions to community
development. On their job opportunities web page PolyMet states that they provide
“family-sustaining salaries,” shifting the emphasis away from the monetary aspect of
mining and towards a focus on supporting families (PolyMet 2019). For an industry that
is constantly challenged for being focused on profit and their bottom line, the more they

48

are able to transform strict economics into support of community and family, the more
they are able to grow beyond a money-focused image. That said, identifying themselves
as a critical piece in the economic landscape of the Iron Range is a big part of how they
promote themselves and gain public support.
PolyMet also takes an active role in community development on the Iron Range.
One major way they do this is by funding socially oriented programs, including a high
school scholarship (aptly named “Mining for Excellence”) and community college
leadership programs that focus on educating and retaining Iron Range graduates. The
company also sponsors the high school hockey league, co-sponsors the East Range
Community Advisory Panel (a self-described diverse community group that meets to
interact with residents about Iron Range issues), and provides monetary and in-kind
charitable donations to various other community programs (PolyMet 2018). In this way
they present themselves as a positive force on the Iron Range community landscape.
Rather than promoting themselves as “the good guys,” environmental advocacy
groups tend to vilify both mining groups and regulatory agencies. By creating a villain,
they are, implicitly, setting themselves up as the heroic force of good standing between
the bad guys and certain environmental destruction. The imagery used throughout
WaterLegacy’s website and social media posts frequently includes pristine natural
photographs, demonstrating what residents stand to lose if they allow PolyMet to begin
mining operations (WaterLegacy 2018). Unlike PolyMet, however, WaterLegacy also
utilizes imagery of degraded landscapes, including streams running yellow, slickens (i.e.,
soil deposits so toxic that nothing can grow in them), and rusted signs with warnings such
as “Contaminated fish, do not eat” (WaterLegacy 2018). This type of imagery further
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vilifies PolyMet as the would-be polluter, playing on fear of a toxic future that could last
for centuries and an accepted distaste for polluted landscapes.
Environmental groups challenge PolyMet’s claim that they are invested
community members, calling out the historical trend in similar mining operations for
small, national (or close-to-national in the case of Toronto-based PolyMet) mining
companies to sell to large, international corporations who then disappear before
remediation of the mine is completed. WaterLegacy is quick to point out PolyMet’s
association with Glencore PLC, “a notoriously corrupt multinational corporation”
(WaterLegacy 2016). Glencore serves as PolyMet’s “strategic partner,” owns a sizeable
portion of the company, and holds the rights to “all products” from the proposed
NorthMet mine (WaterLegacy 2018). Highlighting these associations serves to
undermine PolyMet’s claims that they prioritize northern Minnesota’s environment and
communities and instead associates them with “notorious,” “corrupt,” and faceless
international baddies.
WaterLegacy also challenges PolyMet’s claim that they prioritize Iron Range
communities’ needs by highlighting stakeholders who are left out of the decision-making
process and in some cases adamantly oppose the proposed mining. NorthMet would be
located on treaty lands, ceded in 1854 by the Ojibwe, who retain legal rights to hunting,
fishing, and gathering on the tract. Such harvesting includes fish, plants, wild rice, and
wildlife that could be adversely affected by any wetland or watershed pollution that could
result from a failure of mining technology (WaterLegacy 2018). Ojibwe tribal
organizations have taken explicit stands against PolyMet throughout the permitting
process, including publishing a “major difference of opinion” (included as an appendix in
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the final EIS) and a formal request for an additional evaluation of mine design in 2019
(DNR 2019). In 2019 the Fond du Lac band brought litigation against the EPA and U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers over two permits that had been granted to PolyMet (one
regarding water quality and one regarding wetlands) (Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa v. EPA and Army Corps of Engineers). Most recently, the Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe – which includes the Boise Forte, Fond du Lac, Grand Portage, Leech
Lake, Mille Lacs and White Earth bands – issued an unprecedented joint letter in support
of a bill to ban copper-nickel mining in Northern Minnesota (Chavers 2020).
Environmental groups have raised concerns that PolyMet has not been transparent
about their intentions regarding scope of operations. Environmentalists point to
PolyMet’s recent financial document that “outlines the much-larger profits that would
come from a larger mine” (Marcotty 2018). By raising these allegations, anti-mining
groups are able both to call into question the trustworthiness of PolyMet and to leverage
concerns as a means of bolstering litigation that would call for an additional
environmental impact statement. Previous requests for an additional EIS by WaterLegacy
and other environmental organizations have been denied by the DNR (DNR 2018). Most
recently, three of PolyMet’s permits have been cancelled, pending a contested case
hearing to further consider environmental risks of the proposed mine. As of March 2020,
the DNR and PolyMet are slated to appeal this ruling in front of the Minnesota Supreme
Court (Associated Press 2020).
WaterLegacy’s vilification of opponents in the controversy extends beyond
mining groups and to the regulatory agencies who have approved the many mining
permits and denied requests for additional review processes put forward by advocacy

51

groups. On the top of their website’s home page, WaterLegacy begs visitors to “Take
Action,” “Don’t Let MPCA Gut Our Rules,” and “Save our water quality standards!”
(WaterLegacy 2018). In introducing the proposed changes to water quality standards,
WaterLegacy asserts that “here they go again,” calling out the MPCA for repeatedly
failing to adequately protect and enforce water quality through legislation (WaterLegacy
2018). This wording normalizes regulatory agencies’ alleged failures and works to
undermine citizen trust in governmental agencies. In light of their claim to be the
“protectors” of clean water and communities, WaterLegacy alleges a need for
environmental organizations to step up and fill the role that regulatory governmental
agencies have failed to uphold.
Circumference & Simplification
Pro-mining and environmental groups draw different physical and temporal
boundaries around the NorthMet issue, which serve to highlight and occlude different
aspects of the proposed NorthMet project. PolyMet speaks to the issue in terms of the
economically depressed mining communities in northern Minnesota, as well as the
national need for precious earth metals. Indeed, they seek to “solidify the state’s position
as a supplier of critical raw materials for the nation and usher in a new era of economic
prosperity on the East Range” (PolyMet 2018). They draw boundaries such that the issue
is contained within discussions of economics and technology. By speaking to the
economic benefits of the project, especially in terms of the history of mining in
Minnesota, PolyMet obscures the potential effects of NorthMet on other critical
economic contributors in the region, including recreation industries, certain ecosystem
services (e.g., wild rice), and forest management. Issues of human health or water
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degradation are explained through the technological advancements of the mining
industry, rather than addressed on an individual, experiential level. The impetus for the
NorthMet project is explained through the need for continued technological advancement
on a societal level, without considering alternative strategies for development.
The boundaries PolyMet uses for the issue are also implicitly temporal. By
speaking to job creation and appealing to economic sensibilities, they place the issue in
the short term. According to the DNR’s permit to mine, PolyMet plans to keep the mine
in operation for 20 years (Kraker 2018). Using broad promises to leave a restored natural
landscape when extraction is complete, PolyMet does not address how they will leave the
economic landscape once the high-paying jobs created in association with the NorthMet
mine go the way of historical taconite mines (i.e., disappear). Presenting new mining
opportunities as a solution to the slump of old mining opportunities leaves out the
potential for a re-imagining of the economic landscape that creates longer-term, highpaying jobs.
In contrast, groups that oppose the NorthMet mine focus on the potential longterm effects of the project. On their website, WaterLegacy asserts that while the proposed
length of the NorthMet project is 20 years, the “duration of pollution from mine pits and
other permanent contaminant sources [is] perpetual” (WaterLegacy 2016). This serves to
define the economic benefits asserted by PolyMet as short-term and the potential
pollution as long-term, indeed, forever. In emphasizing long-term effects and creating a
large-scale temporal scope for the NorthMet issue, WaterLegacy fails to address the
short-term economic needs of Iron Range residents.
Leveraging rhetoric to affect social license to operate
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The rhetorical strategies implemented by both PolyMet and WaterLegacy can be
considered in terms of their efforts to sway public opinion and gain or block social
license to operate (SLO). How each side frames the proposed NorthMet project through
their definition of the issue (i.e., what is included and what is left out in how the issue is
framed), identification (i.e., how each group characterizes themselves while distancing
from the opposing group and works to build relationships with stakeholders), and
circumference (i.e., what is included and what is left out based on how each group
presents the spatial and temporal scope of the issue), can be considered in terms of how it
relates to one or more of the three components of SLO laid out by Boutilier and Thomas
and others (i.e., legitimacy, credibility, and trust).
By defining the issue in terms of the economic benefits that NorthMet would
bring on national, regional, and local scales, PolyMet asserts their economic legitimacy.
Through emphasis on local job creation and contributing to the community through
scholarships and coalition building, they seek to establish their socio-political legitimacy
and build social capital. In tandem with their relationship-building, PolyMet’s assertion
that they are a part of the community, with a deep connection to place serves to build a
foundation of interactional trust, wherein they act as a member of the Iron Range
community and have residents interests at heart. By relegating environmental concerns
over the NorthMet project to the realm of technical rationality, wherein advanced
scientific knowledge and the resulting infrastructure, in conjunction with agreed upon
amounts of money and time set aside for mitigation, serves to build institutionalized trust.
WaterLegacy, through their own rhetorical strategies, seeks to undermine each of
these components of SLO in turn. By drawing much larger borders or circumferences
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around the issue in terms of time, they call into question the economic legitimacy of the
project. If NorthMet is only operational for twenty years and cleanup lasts for over 200
and is ultimately passed off to taxpayers, then the jobs created are not necessarily enough
of an incentive to support the mine. By emphasizing the potential detrimental effects of
the mine on human health, as well as the environmental justice issues associated with
how tribes are affected, WaterLegacy challenges the socio-political legitimacy of
PolyMet by asserting that, far from contributing positively to the region, they serve as a
decidedly negative force. WaterLegacy challenges the institutional trustworthiness of
PolyMet by emphasizing their relationship to Glencore, a notorious international
organization, thereby undermining PolyMet’s assertion that they are a part of the
community with the Iron Range’s best interests at heart. This lack of concern for the
community and intention to follow through on promises is further bolstered by
WaterLegacy’s emphasis on environmental health, as well as their assertion that
PolyMet’s financial outlooks reflect a much larger operation than proposed in the
permitting applications. By including cultural rationality in their consideration of the
dangers of mining, WaterLegacy undercuts the institutional trustworthiness of PolyMet in
terms of their inability to protect the environment.
In this analysis it is useful to consider rhetorical strategies in terms of how they
contribute to PolyMet achieving or failing to achieve a social license to operate by
affecting public opinion. Considering the rhetorical strategies of definition, identification,
and circumference utilized by both PolyMet and WaterLegacy clarifies what information
is included and what is obscured within different narratives of the complex NorthMet
issue. Doing so helps make sense of how groups frequently speak across each other (as
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Lange noted in the spotted owl debate) rather than speaking directly to each other. The
goal is not to convince the other side to change their mind, nor in most cases to
completely disprove a point that the other side is making, but to prove more convincing
to undecided stakeholders. By speaking across each other, environmental groups ignore
the economic needs of the community while PolyMet sweeps environmental concerns
under the rug as an issue of money and science.
This brief rhetorical analysis considers how PolyMet and WaterLegacy, who have
been two of the most vocal players throughout the NorthMet permitting process, have
worked to leverage public opinion for or against the proposed mine. In the next section I
will analyze comments on the final environmental impact statement and semi-structured
interviews conducted in early 2020 to address where and for what reason social license to
operate has been granted or withheld by a range of individual stakeholders.

Social License to Operate
In the following section I present and discuss data gleaned from public comments,
semi-structured interviews, and op-eds on the proposed PolyMet mine in local Minnesota
publications using a social license to operate (SLO) framework. Of the 100 sampled
public comments, 12 were in favor of the mine being permitted, 84 were against the mine
being permitted, and four did not take a stance on the final outcome of the mine. Four
interviewees were in favor of the mine being permitted and four were against it. This
section is organized in ascending order up the metaphorical ladder of SLO, including
sections on legitimacy, credibility, and trust. At the end of this section I include data that
does not readily fit into the SLO framework but is nevertheless critical to understanding
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the issue of the proposed NorthMet mine on the Arrowhead region, demonstrating one of
the limitations of the framework, namely, specificity to the particular case.
As discussed in the preceding literature review, social license to operate refers to
a society’s general acceptance of a corporation or project, considered separately from
regulatory acceptance (Holley and Mitcham 2016:18). SLO includes three major
components – legitimacy, credibility, and trust (Moffat and Zhang 2014). Scholars have
operationalized the framework to explore community reactions to proposed mining
projects, and the subsequent success or failure of these projects (Holley and Mitcham
2016, Conde and Le Billon 2017, Prno and Slocombe 2012).
While a useful framework, the concept of social license to operate originated in
the mining industry and, even when used outside of extractive industries, includes
potential biases in favor of extractive considerations by using the goal of obtaining social
license for a given project as a lens through which to view people’s perceptions and
experiences. Successful implementation of SLO, for example, refers to a mining
company achieving community support for a mining project, thereby implying positivity,
though a mining project may not be viewed as “positive” in all cases or by all
stakeholders. SLO is also ultimately a generalized framework, considering issues of
legitimacy, credibility, and trust, without necessarily fully fleshing out the landscape of
the region in terms of history, identity, values, and political tensions. It also speaks to the
need for community support without acknowledging the existence of many different,
often conflicting, communities in the same region with varying degrees of sociopolitical
power, and therefore varying degrees of importance when considering social license to
operate. In the following analysis I utilize an SLO framework to consider public
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perceptions of the NorthMet project as demonstrated through public comments on the
final environmental impact statement and in interviews with eight residents of the
Arrowhead Region.
Legitimacy
According to Koivurova et al., legitimacy, in terms of social license to operate, is
“the belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper,
and just” (2015:198). This is the foundation for achieving any degree of social license,
and includes the most basic potential value of a project, such as economic viability (i.e., a
project includes the provision of some sort of economic benefit to stakeholders) and
socio-economic validity (i.e., the project has an net positive effect on a community or
region and is perceived as fair by stakeholders) (Boutilier and Thomas 2011:4). Issues of
legitimacy were at the forefront of all data sources, highlighting the economic potential of
NorthMet and contested socio-political aspects of the proposed mine, including who is
considered a “stakeholder” and should have a voice in the conversation, potential cultural
impacts and issues of environmental justice, issues of pollution, and consideration of the
fairness and transparency off the current legal process for attaining necessary mining
permits.

Economic legitimacy. A consistent theme throughout conversations about the
proposed PolyMet mine is the economic legitimacy of the project. Since the decline of
the steel and taconite industries, due both to falling prices and increasing mechanization
of the mining process, the Iron Range of Minnesota has seen significant out-migration
and a decrease in services offered (e.g., grocery stores, movie theaters, public schools,
medical clinics). This was visible to me as an outsider walking or driving through towns
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on the Iron Range, where the number of vacant storefronts frequently outnumbered the
number of open businesses. Aurora, the small town next to Hoyt Lakes that I used as a
home base when conducting interviews, had recently lost its only grocery store.
Interviewees spoke of the increasing need to drive further or pay more for services that
were previously readily available to them in their hometowns.
Four of the interview participants spoke about changes in the Iron Range
throughout their lifetime from thriving communities with an array of services, including
businesses and schools, to a severely diminished landscape, both in terms of services
offered and population. One participant described the Iron Range towns when he was a
kid compared to today:
I'd hop on my bike in the morning and drive through town, the street was full of
cars and businesses. It seems like I just slowly watch it die. It's kind of
discouraging. You watch it. You see it through all the towns – Hibbing, Virginia,
Chisum – you know, closed storefronts... Back then it was just booming all over
the place. My mom used to bring me down to Virginia and we'd walk down the
main street… shopping for school clothes or whatever it was. People all over…
It's depressing to see what's happening. The Iron Range, it was good. But now it
looks like it's just - through automation or whatever - it's slowly dying.
The potential job creation and economic windfall of the NorthMet project has therefore
played a major role in the conversation. Proponents of the mine speak to new, highpaying jobs bringing more people to the region and the potential to expand community
businesses and services. Those against the mine speak to the potential effect of any
resulting pollution on the tourist industry and the relatively short life of the mine project.
Thirty-six of the 100 public comments mentioned the creation of jobs and the
importance of mining to the economy of the Iron Range. Some were positive and used it
to justify NorthMet as a project that will “create needed job[s] in north eastern
Minnesota.” One commenter claimed that “The Iron Range community deserves this
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mine and the jobs that go with it… I was born and raised on the Iron Range, have you
been there lately, their communities need the work,” while others heralded the “economic
advantages that would result” from NorthMet. Commenters both for and against the
NorthMet project spoke to the economic depression of the Iron Range where, “jobs are
badly needed in the area” and “350 jobs are huge for this area!”
Interviewees expounded on the need for jobs in the region. One interviewee stated
that, “The people that live up in that part of the state are hungry for jobs. And mining jobs
are good, really good paying jobs. So that's the carrot that they're hanging on to.” Another
explained that, while he did not see unemployment as a huge issue in the region, “we
want jobs with decent paychecks.” He qualified this statement, asserting that it
exemplifies the need to diversify the economy of the region to include long-term highwage jobs, rather than relying on the short-term opportunities that the NorthMet mine
would provide. Another interviewee described mining jobs as “jobs you can raise a
family on,” going on to explain that this sort of job, complete with pension and health
insurance, is increasingly difficult to find in the area.
Others spoke to both the good-paying mining jobs and the expansion of service
and tangential industry jobs that would be created by the proposed NorthMet mine:
You know, many [recreation jobs] are at twenty-four, twenty-eight thousand
dollars [a year] is all. Whereas these mining jobs you start out at maybe eighty
grand. It's very good paying. And a lot of the issue is that while it's a foreign
company that owns it, but it's us that is working it. It's the people that are going to
have a good paying income. The people that are going to go down to Mike's
Motors and buy a car or truck or buy groceries or clothing or whatever.
The re-establishment of lost services in the region was mentioned by six interviewees as a
major obstacle in the region, and a large benefit that could come as a result the NorthMet
project and other mining projects in the region.
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While two commenters claimed that “the project will provide immediate and long
term financial stability for many businesses,” twenty-two spoke of the lack of longevity
of the jobs created by a mine slated to be open for a few decades, the boom-and-bust
cycle of mining operations, or that an economic trade-off for environmental pollution
would not be worth it. One commenter stated that “the cost and risks of environmental
catastrophe however greatly outweighs the short-term job growth.” Another claimed that
“the number of people to be employed by the industry does not outweigh the risk for
severe and permanent environmental damage.” One interviewee, who had spent his life
working in the mining industry both in Minnesota and throughout the country explained:
I've seen mining communities over the years. I guess the one thing I've noticed
when I go back 30 years later, they're not thriving… a part of my opposition to
mining in Minnesota is not just that it's environmentally damaging, it's
economically unproductive. You know, I live on the Iron Range and you look at
the length of that community of the Iron Range, and there's not one really thriving
community.
This speaks to the idea that new mining operations would serve to perpetuate the boom
and bust cycle that he sees as endemic to the region rather than helping the Iron Range
break out of that cycle.
Other interviewees addressed the potentially short-term nature of the jobs, though
they questioned the commonly used number of 20 877765ww5years of mining operation
that was presented throughout the public comments. One interviewee stated that “the
mines… are expected to last for 20 years, which seems kind of short to me. I suspect it
will go on longer than that. And then once they get that part mined out, they'll go deeper,
wider or something.” Another asserted that the boom and bust cycle that has typified the
region is largely due to “external reasons” such as “major economic downturns in the
United States” that affected the economy on a national level and was not unique to the
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Iron Range. He ultimately argued that “the mining industry is going to be here… it has
been here since the late eighteen hundreds and it’s still going.”
Both pro-mine and anti-mine individuals spoke of the increasing mechanization of
the mining industry and the resulting decrease in jobs available within the mining
industry. One talked about how “they take fewer and fewer people to do the same amount
of mining.” Another, who has worked in the mining industry for over 40 years, explained
that “when Reserve was in its heyday, we had better than 3000 employees. And today
we're producing maybe more tons than was produced back then with 3000 people. We've
got maybe 500 [employees]. It's a whole different ball game.” He went on to assert that
the automation has been critical to maintaining the ability to compete in the mining
industry and, while fewer jobs will be available, the jobs that are created are good jobs
that are critical to the region.
Many commenters addressed the need to break out of the boom and bust cycle
through economic diversification in the region. One stated that “Northern Minnesota
needs a diverse economy and mining would just be more of the boom and bust job pattern
that has always been a problem in that region.” Another stated that, “for a few hundred
jobs for a number of finite years? People of the north deserve jobs that will last.” This
need for diversification also came up in four interviews, where participants expressed
their dissatisfaction with the narrative of mining versus tourism jobs and brought up the
need for bolstering other industries on the Iron Range, such as healthcare and agriculture.
While many comments reference the need for continued diversification of the
region, fifteen comments speak specifically to the potential affects that NorthMet would
have on the recreation and tourism industry. One local outfitter stated that, “There are
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many of us who would like to stay at our jobs we’ve carved out for ourselves in some of
the tourism industry, who are NOT pining for jobs in the mining industry.” Another
commenter emphasized that, “a sustainable tourism and recreation economy depends on
clean lakes and water,” while a third claimed that “run off into Lake Superior will effect
tourism… our biggest source of revenue in Cook County.” One commenter asserted that
“this mine that promises to provide 350 jobs for twenty years has no place jeopardizing
the thriving tourism-based economy that sustains 18,000 jobs annually.”
Those who are for the NorthMet project are quick to assert the danger of a direct
comparison between mining jobs and tourism jobs. One interviewee stressed that, while
“tourism has always been a big part of Ely… the mining and the logging provide better
wages for families. These tourist jobs are part time from May to maybe September…
[Iron Range residents] need jobs that pay similar wages year-round, not just three months
a year.” Even interview participants from the Arrowhead region who were ultimately
anti-mine expressed the need to acknowledge this distinction. One interviewee explained:
We've had all these iron mines and taconite mines up there and we've been able to
maintain a pretty healthy outdoors economy, which has been the kind of slowly
but steadily growing. But it doesn't produce a lot of high paying jobs. That's the
challenge... it's hard to survive on those jobs for a lot of people.
Many used this as an example of the need for further diversification of the region to
establish industries that could provide long-term, sustainable jobs that would sustain the
region.
All commenters and interviewees who brought up jobs acknowledged that there
are potential economic benefits to the NorthMet project. How they weighed the potential
economic benefits of the project with potential harms differed, however, as did ideas for
how the Iron Range should move forward economically (e.g., through further
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diversification of the economic landscape or returning to established industries such as
mining). Even at the level of economic legitimacy, which might be considered the most
basic level of social license, there is immense contestation between stakeholders.
Socio-political legitimacy. If a mining operation establishes socio-political
legitimacy, the company or project contributes to the well-being of the area, respects the
local way of life and acts in accordance with community’s views of fairness (Boutilier
and Thomas 2011:4). In terms of the proposed NorthMet mine, this includes concerns
about pollution, such as potential effects on human health, beauty of the landscape, and
environmental justice. Also included within the umbrella of socio-political legitimacy are
the ways in which the proposed NorthMet mine fits into already established Iron Range
culture or way of life.
Seventy comments included considerations of the potential impacts of NorthMet
on ecosystem and human health. Ecosystem impacts cited included loss of biodiversity,
further detrimental effects on wild rice, reduction of critical habitat and wilderness
corridors, decreased water quality, and decreased air quality. Many comments remained
broad in their concern over potential effects of the mine, speaking of “horrific and
irreversible environmental damage,” a “change in quality of Minnesota’s north woods
and lakes,” and “poisoning more than 21,000 acres,” while others homed in on specific
aspects of ecological degradation.
Many commenters spoke of the importance of water quality in a uniquely water
rich region. One asserted that “this mining project is positioned at the headwaters of the
greatest human resource in our entire solar system, the fresh water of the great lakes.”
Others called for an explicit comparison in value between the extractable minerals and
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water resources, including one that asked, “How does the short term need for these lowgrade metals along with 300 jobs justify the pollution of Lake Superior, the largest body
of fresh water on the planet? Water is a long-term, necessary resource.” Another stated
that, “In this age of freshwater shortages, it is unthinkable to me even to consider further
jeopardizing the quality of one of the greatest sources of the very thing right in our own
backyard.”
The emphasis on water quality came up in six of the interviews as well, voiced by
individuals on both sides of the issue. Some interviewees spoke of water resources and
the water richness of Minnesota as the deciding factor in whether or not they would
support the mine. One interviewee asserted the importance of considering our water a
valued resource, stating that “We are a water state. That is our resource. That is the
number one resource. If we're putting gold and nickel and copper and all of these other
metals above water, I mean, you can't drink any of those things or eat them.” Another
explained that the potential water pollution was why he was more concerned about
copper-nickel mining than taconite and that “although [taconite mines] put some
humongous scars in the earth, they do not have a huge impact in terms of water quality,
whereas a copper nickel mining has a huge potential to be a water quality problem.”
While many commenters focused on pollution in terms of ecosystem degradation
and loss of water resources, others spoke of pollution in terms of a diminishment of the
“singular natural beauty” of the region. Comments depicted the Boundary Waters as
“priceless, one of a kind,” a “precious landscape,” “pristine nature,” “the crown jewel of
the national forest system,” and “a global treasure… something future generations need.”
Though these comments speak of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, which is located
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outside of the St. Louis watershed but still in proximity to the proposed NorthMet mine,
others spoke specifically in terms of the beauty of the great lakes and of Jay Cooke State
Park (located downstream of the mine site, along the St. Louis river).
Many of these comments refer to the potential effects on future generations and
the obligation of the present generation to preserve resources and beauty for the future.
One commenter claimed that, “We owe it to subsequent generations of Minnesotans, as
well as to the rest of the planet, to safeguard this rare freshwater treasure.” Others stated
that, “the waters of northern Minnesota must be kept pristine for future generations,” and
that the beauty of northern Minnesota “must be preserved for generations to come.”
Some interviewees took issue with this persistent call to protect the pristine
beauty of the environment. One criticized the usage of emotional rhetoric around pristine
beauty utilized by environmental groups, stating that:
When you say, well, let's protect the Boundary Waters, money comes in like
crazy. Because, I mean, of course we want to protect it. But the thing of it is that
many of their people will say, you know, I spend so many days up on this lake
and that lake, oh, and the glory and the beauty and all the sky, the stars up above,
you know, and so poetic and stuff like that. And it is. It really is. But it doesn't
feed families.
She went on to assert that her support of mining did not undermine her love of the
environment, stating that water pollution is “the last thing that I would want to see. And I
would make sure that the company addressed any issue, not stop the whole mining, but
address the issue, make it better.”
Many commenters spoke of pollution not only in terms of environmental
degradation but also in terms of human health. One aspect of this concern is regarding
human health issues that could arise due to potential water pollution, including “risks to
drinking water,” and bioaccumulation in the ecosystem, which presents “risks to
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vulnerable populations… who rely on fish for subsistence.” Another aspect of concerns
about human health are for mine workers themselves. Some commenters spoke of
“hundreds of jobs which will in turn create hundreds of workman’s comp claims from the
multitude of health problems created” and “risks to the health of plant and mine workers
from exposure to cancer-causing asbestos-like fibers and metal dust.”
Pro-mine interviewees emphasized that their support of the mine does not indicate
a lack of concern about the environment. They highlight the “strict water policies” in
Minnesota as well as the long history of mining in the region and mining companies and
residents alike “learning from our mistakes” in a way that mitigates the risk and bolsters
the preparedness of the region to deal with potential environmental impacts. One
participant described the “balancing act” of protecting the environment while supporting
the economy, ultimately concluding that “there might be a little bit of pollution but it's
going really build up the economy.”
Holley and Mitcham emphasize the fact that “social license is most commonly
withdrawn based on perceived risk or lack of benefits to stakeholders” (2016:25). While
both economic benefits and environmental risks are acknowledged by stakeholders on
both sides of the issue, ultimately their acknowledgement of legitimacy of NorthMet
seems to be based in their personal weighing of the associated risks and benefits of the
mine. Proponents of the mine acknowledge the environmental risks involved in mining
but feel that the tradeoff is worth it to achieve economic stability and thriving
communities in the region. Those that are against NorthMet, while acknowledging the
need for economic stimulus in the region in the form of good-paying jobs, believe that the
risk of environmental degradation is too great to allow the project to move forward.
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Legal legitimacy. Another aspect of socio-political legitimacy is the legal status
of the proposed mine. In other words, that “the company has all necessary legal permits
in place and is observing the official legal norms” (Koivurova et al. 2015:). While there
was not a question of whether or not the mine had legally received permits in the sampled
comments, commenters expressed either support for or critique of how the permitting
process was conducted. As of Winter 2019, three of PolyMet’s permits were overturned
by The Minnesota Court of Appeals court and the company is currently in partnership
with the DNR to appeal these rulings to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Additionally, the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency was brought to court for potential suppression of
EPA comments critiquing the mine. Accordingly, questions surrounding the legal
legitimacy of the permitting process, including current litigation and what is required in
the process, played a major role in the conversations I had with residents of the
Arrowhead region in February 2020.
One aspect of the permitting process that was critiqued throughout the comments
was the role of transparency throughout the permitting. Twenty commenters spoke to the
need for transparency or lack of transparency surrounding the inner workings of the
permitting process, technical plans for the mine, financial structures of accountability,
and a full discussion of potential environmental ramifications of the mine. Many of these
comments refer explicitly to the issues of risk and the unknown. One commenter claimed
that, “The public has the right to know what the financial assurance package entails, and
the risk involved, before the project is permitted.” Others call for inclusion of risk
assessments and the “need to be transparent and not just scattered throughout the
document,” claim that “the DNR… glosses over modeling,” that “PolyMet’s final EIS is
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full of general information, but very short on details.” Another criticizes the document,
stating that “the FEIS does not address numerous substantive questions of critical
importance to providing the public with a clear understanding of the purpose, nature,
scope, and environmental and public health impacts of the project.”
Related to transparency was the potential for bias due to the close relationships
between the DNR, the mining company, and the scientists conducting studies throughout
the permitting process. One commenter stated that, “Also concerning is the retention of a
law firm with strong ties to the mining industry…this lack of independence and
transparency raises a question about the resolve of the State to adequately represent the
best interest of its citizens and protect the environment.” Another called out the DNR for
refusing to allow outside review of their scientific findings:
DNR rejected the request for an independent third party to review the
findings… we find it troubling that outside scientists from the Great
Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission have questioned the
‘modeling assumptions’ provided by DNR and used by PolyMet’s
engineering firm, Barr Engineering, a firm that could gain substantial
economic benefits by the mine’s approval and construction.
Commenters generally called the DNR in its EIS “to be transparent and objective by not
just promoting benefits of PolyMet, and also clarifying the consequences to our water
quality and environment…” Ultimately, while PolyMet was permitted and followed the
requirements of the permitting process, the legal legitimacy of PolyMet relating to the
validity of the permitting process itself remains an open question.
Three commenters specifically state that they felt the permitting process and
scientific analysis had been adequately sound and transparent. One stated that, “the indepth review and analyses of the potential impacts of the project more than adequately
demonstrate [the viability] of the new mine as well as reuse of existing facilities with
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related infrastructure improvements can be constructed and operated in an
environmentally responsible manner.” Others criticized the constant critiques and
litigation throughout the length of the permitting process, stating that, “PolyMet mining
project now has the completed NorthMet Final Environmental Impact Statement. Let
PolyMet, MNDNR, and the co-lead agencies do their job.”
The sentiment that the DNR adequately considered NorthMet throughout the
permitting process and was transparent throughout was reiterated in three of the
interviews. One participant stated that he felt the DNR’s decision was “not kneejerk,
they've spent the time. They've studied it, they've taken into account everybody who's put
in… comments, and they've come up with an answer that says, yes, these people can
meet the regulations that are set in front of them… so there is no reason to say they can't
have a permit.” Another asserted, “I thought the DNR—from my point of view—was
open and transparent about what they were doing.” Interviewees mentioned the town
halls and multiple opportunities for public comment as examples of how community
questions and voices were heard throughout the process.
Others reiterated the fact that PolyMet had adequately passed the requirements
laid forth in the permitting process and concluded that environmentalists’ issues were
with the laws themselves, which should be considered separately. One pro-NorthMet
interviewee stated that:
They [PolyMet] have done as good as they can under the present laws. If the laws
are that inadequate, then these environmental groups need to be addressing the
legislators to change the laws. As far as we can see, the laws have been met, have
been addressed and PolyMet has met all these. All these steps, stipulations, and
stuff. They should be allowed to move forward and start construction and then
mine.
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Another interviewee argued a similar point, stating that NorthMet should move forward
because the permitting process was laid out by the state as the necessary set of procedures
and should not be changed or stalled through litigation at this point. He firmly supported
the governmental process as it is set up, continuing by asking, “can the state make those
regulations stronger, harder? Yeah, let’s do that. Let’s call our representatives and get
those strengthened or added, whatever. But we’ve got a process. Here’s what you follow.
You can’t change the goalposts in midstream.” These comments establish PolyMet as
legitimate, in that the company has strived to meet the goals as set forth by the Minnesota
government. Questions of legal legitimacy are then shifted from NorthMet and on to
governmental agencies who craft and implement the requirements.
Other participants argued that the permitting process was perfunctory and that
biases within the process and political pressures had served to determine the outcome
before the analysis and input process was complete. One participant asserted that the
“conclusion was built into the process… The people that I see doing the permitting, they
decided that they're going to permit this mine and they're going to follow the procedures,
cross the t’s, dot the i’s, and then they're going to permit the mine. And my thought is we
have to change that attitude in our permitting process.” Another had a similar feeling of
predetermination, though he felt like the DNR’s transparency throughout the permitting
process has not been in question, stating, “I think as far as being pretty transparent to the
public as far as what was going on in the permitting process and opportunities to
comment and all that… I can't fault them too much for that. But you always felt like the
end result had been pretty much predetermined and it was more they were going through
the process.” Again, issues of transparency and legitimacy are shifted away from
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PolyMet and onto the DNR, who some commenters saw as simply jumping through the
necessary hoops to reach a predetermined outcome, implying that that the permitting
process itself was simply performative.
Ultimately, commenters and interviewees agreed that the requirements of the
permitting process have been largely fulfilled. Where they disagreed was regarding (1)
the adequacy of the process itself and the requirements it set forth, (2) the intentions of
the regulating agencies, and (3) the degree to which politics and power influenced
permitting decisions as opposed to an unbiased consideration of the project in terms of
risks and benefits. This fits within SLO literature, which notes that “full legal compliance
with state environmental regulations has become an increasingly insufficient means of
satisfying society’s expectations with regards to mining issues” (Prno and Slocombe
2012:346). While PolyMet fulfilled the requirements of the permitting process, some
stakeholders’ lack of trust in the process and the regulatory agencies themselves has
arguably undermined PolyMet’s ability to achieve legal legitimacy in the eyes of
stakeholders. This shortcoming has in turn led to litigation, which has significantly
slowed the full permitting of the mine.
Credibility
While a significant contingent of commenters and interviewees questioned even
the basic tenets of legitimacy regarding the NorthMet project, others maintained that the
project is legitimate based on economic benefits, socio-political appropriateness, and
legal requirements. The next aspect of social license to operate is credibility, which can
be understood as “the foundation of trust” and “the absence of sociopolitical risk”
(Koivurova et al. 2015:198). When a mining company is considered credible, “it is seen
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as following through on promises and dealing honestly with everyone” (Thomson and
Boutilier 2011:1785). The comments discussed when considering socio-political
legitimacy in the previous section speak to numerous indications of socio-political risk
perceived by the public, including risk of pollution and intergenerational justice.
Additional sources of risk or perceived risk that came out of the comments and interviews
included financial reliability of PolyMet as a company and technical risk in terms of
scientific knowledge.
PolyMet’s technical and financial credibility. In considering PolyMet’s
credibility, many commenters and interviewees questioned both whether PolyMet will
follow through on promises, but also that they can. Commenters questioned the
company’s ability to conduct environmental remediation as promised due to technical
abilities (e.g., whether it is possible, based on current data, to fully remediate after this
type of mining) and financial stability (e.g., if PolyMet will remain financially viable
through the end of proposed remediation), as well as the difficulties surrounding planning
for 200 years from now.
One major theme that emerged in the comments was the time frame that PolyMet
has set forth for remediation. Fifty-four commenters criticized the long-term temporal
aspect of site treatment and ecosystem remediation in terms of monetary costs, ecosystem
health, and technical know-how. One states that “the need to treat water for centuries is a
significant design failure; it is likely to be impossible.” Another asks, “how can a
nonexistent company guarantee anything in the way of long-term environmental
protection, or even care, for that matter, that far into the future?” Other commenters refer
to the proposed length of cleanup as “truly incredible” and “crazy.”
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Interviewees also questioned the length of cleanup proposed by PolyMet. One
stated that:
There is absolutely no way to do this without causing harm, requiring long term
treatment that just isn't sustainable. I mean, they're talking about hundreds of
years of treatment... We don't even know what our society is going to look
like…the waste problem is so big that it dwarfs, for me, any positive impact that
come to it.
Another took issue with the claim that NorthMet would be built using the best technology
to set them up for a long-term remediation project. She asked, “when you say we have the
best technology, we can do it well from 500 years from now, is that technology still going
to be the best technology and is it still going to be doing what it was proposed to do? ...
you know, they say that they're going to invest and have the money to clean it up. I don't
trust them.”
A smaller number of commenters questioned PolyMet’s financial ability to follow
through on promises of remediation. Eight comments speak to the potential for
bankruptcy or financial ruin that would preclude PolyMet’s ability to financially provide
for cleanup costs. Eight comments explicitly talk about cleanup costs in terms of the
proposed timeline of “perpetual treatment,” asking “what and or who will be around to
manage problems in 2 or 3 hundred years or longer?” Again, the uncertainty inherent in
making plans in terms of centuries serves to undermine the credibility of PolyMet.
Particularly in a landscape that has witnessed the economic boom and bust cycle and
technical failures of extractive companies for over a century, it is difficult for many
stakeholders to take PolyMet at their word when they make long-term promises.
In addition to technical and financial ability to follow through on promises, some
individuals question the intentions of PolyMet to do so. One major theme that emerged
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from the sampled comments was the perception of corporate greed and the mining
industry’s prioritization of profits over health and safety, which was mentioned explicitly
in twenty-three comments and alluded to in many others. Commenters voiced the
sentiment that “they [PolyMet] are after making money first,” that there is a focus on
“immediate monetary rewards” and “personal profit” over environmental regulation and
that the entire proposed mine and permitting process “smacks of greed, corruption, and
personal profiteering.” One comment claimed that “corporations are always in a rush due
to stock price pressures, yet the public interest is to NOT rush things.” This sentiment
regarding “a strong economic incentive to shave corners wherever possible,” including at
the expense of environmental protection and mine safety emerged in many comments.
One commenter stated that, “they will never live here, never invest positive time and
energy in our communities except where that investment begets enormous stockholder
profit.”
In tandem with the theme of corporate greed was the concept of financial
accountability and the concern that PolyMet would not be held accountable for potential
environmental implications of the mine on a long-term time scale. Thirty-three comments
mentioned the cleanup costs of the proposed NorthMet mine. Four comments speak
explicitly to the belief that without strict financial accountability, PolyMet would “take
their money and leave” and that “the mining industry is notorious for avoiding liability
after taking financial gains.” Others simply alluded to the fact that PolyMet might fail to
complete clean-up due to the extremely long proposed time scale (200-500 years).
Such characterization of PolyMet does not necessarily undermine the company’s
capacity to gain credibility. While being a “good corporate citizen” is gaining traction in
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some sectors of the business community, corporations within the extractive industry are
not necessarily expected to act against the bottom line. Historical union structures and
financial contracts are in place to account for this. Nevertheless, the characterization of
PolyMet as willing to shave corners and prioritize profit over communities was a
consistent theme in comments and conversations, serving to influence how individuals
considered the NorthMet issue and whether or not they trusted PolyMet, which will be
discussed in more detail in following section.
Some commenters considered this characterization in terms of the potential
consequences if financial promises are not kept. Sixteen comments speak specifically to
the potential ramifications of NorthMet on taxpayers or the state should cleanup be
abandoned before completion. Comments were largely skeptical of PolyMet’s claim that
they will remain financial backers of remediation and claimed that the bulk of costs, both
in terms of economic cost and ecological cost, will be “funded by public moneys,” or “by
the expense of the taxpayers.” One comment claimed that “if those who stand to profit
from this venture are unwilling to risk their money then the tax-payers should not risk
their money either.”
Fifteen comments consider the potential long-term ramifications in terms of the
short-term benefits of NorthMet, with the general sentiment that the trade-off would not
be worth it as, “the mine will provide jobs, but only in the short run. Eventually the mine
will play out…”, “mines are boom and bust operations – once the minerals are out of the
ground, the operation is over, and only those lucky folks in superior positions get to keep
on,” and that “these ventures always become depleted, leaving devastation.” Here, while
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the commenter does not question PolyMet’s promise of job creation, they articulate what
they see as the unspoken fact that these jobs will be short-lived.
Many comments voiced concerns about PolyMet’s intention and ability to follow
through financially and technically with remediation of the proposed NorthMet mine.
These concerns speak to perceptions of risk, including environmental and economic
impacts on Minnesota and Minnesotans, undermining the credibility of PolyMet, which
requires low risk perception and a modicum of trust. These concerns are in some cases
compounded by and in some cases offset by the long history of mining on the Iron Range
that feeds into the identity of the region and its residents.

Precedence of mining in the region. Many commenters and interviewees speak
implicitly or explicitly to the legacy of mining on the Iron Range. As one interviewee
explained, “this [mining] heritage, this culture is really, really ingrained here… A lot of
people are really proud of that. And that's great because we all should be proud of where
we come from.” When asked to describe the Iron Range, many interviewees went into a
timeline of the different mining companies that had operated regionally over the past fifty
years, demonstrating the importance of mining history to how they think of the region.
Some use the legacy of mining as foundational and a solid precedence for
NorthMet to build on in a positive way. One commenter claimed that “we have been
mining for years up there, we know what we are doing.” An interviewee put it simply,
stating that “mining is what we do,” and going on to assert that the long history of mining
in the region, including both successes and failures, has served to create a community that
understands mining and can do it well. Many see the legacy of mining on the Iron Range
as a reason that NorthMet should move forward, continuing the legacy and run by
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workers that have a deep understanding of mining and love for the landscape. Others,
however, point to the history of taconite mining on the Iron Range and sulfide mining
elsewhere in terms of setting a precedence of pollution and a reason to keep NorthMet
from moving forward.
Eight comments referenced the Dunka Mine, a taconite mine located just
southeast of Babbitt, MN and operational from 1964 until the early 90s by LTV Steel.
Dunka’s mining operations exposed sulfide materials from the copper and nickel deposits
in close proximity to the desired iron ore. As water flowed over the exposed deposits,
acidic drainage flowed into the surface and groundwater of the area with significant
environmental and economic implications. Comments referenced the Dunka Pit as an
example of how environmental and economic impacts have a precedent of negatively
affecting the Iron Range explaining that “we, the public, have been monitoring and
adapting [to] the Dunka Pit’s drainage for many years without solving the issue.”
Others used the Dunka Pit as an example of regulatory failure to prevent negative
impacts. One comment claimed that “the DNR has repeatedly failed to enforce exi[s]ting
rules and regulations, such as the sulfate standard and continued variances at the Dunka
mine seriously undermin[ing] its credibility as an effective steward of our Public
Resources.” One interviewee, who had had a career with the Minnesota DNR, alluded to
the agency’s failure to hold previous and existing mines to the legal standards. He stated
that, “we've learned that the permits permit them to mine, but I'm not sure they do a very
good job of actually controlling and regulating what they're doing… And if you can't do a
good job of keeping the taconite mine within their standards, how are you going to do it
with a sulfide mine which is much more dangerous?”
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Other specific and broad examples of mining operations were used throughout the
comments and interviews both to undermine and support credibility. A handful of
comments spoke of the Mount Polley spill in British Columbia, which “passed a similar
environmental impact statement process, then left unacceptable amounts of pollution to
clean up…” Others spoke to the fact that “there are no non-ferrous metal mines that have
not polluted,” alluding to the lack of precedence for successful operations. While past
experiences with mining companies caused some individuals to question the credibility of
PolyMet, for others it seemed to affect how they saw the credibility of regulatory
agencies. Ultimately, it still contributed to undermining a social license for the NorthMet
project but is a notable distinction.
While many comments and interviewees used examples of other mines and
mining companies to undermine the credibility of PolyMet and the NorthMet project,
others used these sorts of case studies to support PolyMet’s credibility. One interviewee
claimed that the Dunka Pit, though “there might be some issues of a leakage depending
on the water level,” is ultimately a success story because it was closed and has been
monitored since 1977. She went on to assert that other mine pits in Minnesota with
sulfide issues are blown out of proportion by environmentalists. She brought up the fact
that trout inhabited some of these pits that had since filled with water, explaining that:
Brook trout are considered like the canary in the coal mine. If the canary dies, you
better get your butt out of that coal mine. If a trout dies, you got a big problem.
These trout were thriving and multiplying, so this low sulfide—2 to 3 percent
sulfide—pit water did not impact the brook trout.
Commenters and interviewees asserted that because of the long experience with mining
on the Iron Range, including experience solving issues of environmental degradation as
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they come up, indicates that the region is uniquely prepared to mine for copper in the
safest way possible.
While there was no consensus among stakeholder groups on the credibility of
PolyMet regarding their proposed NorthMet project, many commenters and interviewees
used the legacy of mining on the Iron Range as a basis for their stance on the issue.
Looking to past issues with pollution, contributions of mining operations to the local
economy, and experiences with mining as a fundamental way of life and identity has
contributed to opinions of stakeholders on both sides of the issue. When considering
social license to operate, public belief in the legitimacy and credibility of a project is
enough to establish public acceptance. As demonstrated through comments and
interviews, this acceptance has been established in at least some major stakeholder
groups, particularly those residing on the Iron Range and with personal experience with
the mining industry. In order to fully achieve social license to operate and psychological
identification, however, there remains the component of trust.

Trust
The final level of the social license to operate framework is trust, which can only
be achieved if both legitimacy and credibility have been attained. The two major types of
trust included in the social license to operate framework are interactional and institutional
trust. Interactional trust includes “the perception that the company and its management
listen, respond, keep promises, engage in mutual dialogue, and demonstrate reciprocity in
its interactions” (Koivurova et al. 2015:198). Interactional trust comes closest to
capturing the idea of trustworthiness, where the mining company can be believed because
they listen and follow through on promises made. Institutional trust includes “a
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perception that relations between the stakeholders’ institutions (e.g., the community’s
representative organizations) and the project / company are based on an enduring regard
for each other’s interests” (Koivurova et al. 2015:198). In other words, trust implies that
the mining company is not looking out solely for their own interests but has a genuine,
long-term investment in the well-being of the community.
PolyMet’s rhetorical strategies of identification and positioning (e.g., identifying
themselves as members of the community through scholarships and partnerships and
language while downplaying their status as partnered with a large multinational
corporation) serve as a critical means of establishing both interactional and institutional
trust in the community. When commenters and interviewees on both sides of the issue
spoke about their level of trust in PolyMet, they often specifically brought up some of the
strategies the company used to establish trust or the arguments that WaterLegacy and
other environmental organizations utilized to undermine it.
When asked about trust, four interviewees cited the relationship between PolyMet
and Glencore as a reason for lack of trust, bringing up the fact that while PolyMet has
engaged with the community and worked to establish relationships, they are ultimately a
part of a larger, outside mining company that prioritizes profit over community
prosperity. One interviewee explained that she is “always just kind of skeptical when it
comes to industry and, you know, multi-national corporations. Something always just
seems too good to be true.”
Alternately, three interviewees who were in favor of NorthMet criticized this
argument as “flimsy,” as working with large, international companies is not setting a new
precedent for mining on the Iron Range. One participant explained that, “if you look at all
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of the taconite mines in the whole area, they're all owned by foreign companies.”
Additionally, she argued that even those who are against mining support multi-national
corporations through industries such as car manufacturing. Three participants spoke to
the fact that despite Glencore being a multi-national corporation, the NorthMet project is
critical to national independence from other countries (and other multi-national
corporations) who the United States currently relies on to supply copper and nickel.
Participants in favor of the NorthMet mine spoke to the fact that, while PolyMet
is backed by Glencore, it is run by locals and individuals who work to have a direct
relationship with the surrounding communities. One interviewee explained that he knew
many of PolyMet’s employees “on a friendship basis. You know, people from the local
industry that I've known for all the years I've been here—professional people.” Another
interviewee stated that, though he did not know any of the PolyMet employees before
their time with the company, he had been able to establish working relationships with
them and felt that they were approachable and professional. While he qualified these
relationships by stating that they do not agree on a lot of things, he ultimately trusted
their intentions and willingness to be transparent about the NorthMet project.
Interviewees felt that their personal relationships with PolyMet employees helped
establish mutual trust.
Others felt that PolyMet’s hiring of locals was nothing more than a tool used to
gain community support and not a valid reason to trust the company. Three interviewees
spoke about the trend of hiring locals at the beginning as a strategic move towards
successful permitting or building goodwill in communities. One interviewee brought up
the fact that though PolyMet intentionally hired locals to work for them throughout the
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permitting process and did outreach to establish themselves as community members,
asserting that this was simply a strategy to get to the permitting process rather than an
indication of character or future intentions. He explained:
I go to mining conferences – I’m an old miner – and they tell you at the mining
conferences how to get permitted. Put a local face on your operation and they
[PolyMet] do that. They brought in some local people… a lot of them from the
iron mining operations… Once a mine is up and running, though, not very much.
Because hiring locals was seen as a specific strategy to gain community support, some
felt that that trend would not continue once it was no longer strategically useful to the
company.
Another participant spoke about this early trend of hiring locals and, when asked
if he would say that he trusted PolyMet he mused:
have they been a corporate good citizen? There's really nothing there. They're
kind of a shell, with employees that get moved in and out. Those of us working on
it always felt that as soon as they got through the permitting process, it would be
sold, and it was immediately. So there are financial players behind the scenes.
To him, these financial players are an indication of lack of transparency and significant
bias that undermines trustworthiness. He expanded on this lack of transparency, and
failure to be upfront about intentions, in a way that is akin to the characterization of
politicians, stating:
And my impression is, through the environmental impact statement for PolyMet,
that they kind of try to do the least that they have to to meet the standards enough
to get the permits. And that's why they're constantly in court and going through
this, rigmarole, because they're always right on the borderline rather than just
saying, okay, we're going to come into Minnesota and build the best copper nickel
mine that was ever built. They'll tell you they're doing that. But in reality, I don't
think [they are].
Another interviewee echoed this sentiment, asserting that while PolyMet has actively
portrayed themselves as environmental stewards who follow the standards, they are
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simultaneously working to change the standards to be less stringent, undermining this
image.
Fifteen public comments brought up the fact that Glencore is a major player in the
issue to argue that NorthMet is ultimately about the financial bottom line, is not invested
in the community, and is more likely to renege on their promises to remediate NorthMet
once it ceases operation and abscond with the money, leaving taxpayers to clean it up.
One commenter stated that, “If the owners are international corporations trying to hold
them responsible for cleanup is nearly impossible.” Another comment asserts that, “the
chances are very, very good that after PolyMet has used up all the resources in the area
they will take their money and leave, and the site will have to be cleaned up by the
expense of the taxpayers.”
Another comment offers a similar sentiment, while undermining PolyMet’s
involvement in the Iron Range (e.g., funding the high school hockey team) as strictly
about making money and not about becoming engaged members of the community
asking, “Do we kid ourselves into thinking that the directors of PolyMet (with
Glencore/BP's Tony Hayward at its head) care about our long-term pollution? They will
never live here, never invest positive time and energy in our communities except where
that investment begets enormous stockholder money.” This concern over the longevity of
PolyMet’s involvement in cleanup is one that came up in many comments and interviews,
both in terms of their ability to commit to long-term cleanup as detailed in the credibility
section and in terms of intention to follow through on their promises, which seems to
affect perception of credibility but is more firmly rooted in issues of trust.
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While some commenters and interviewees brought up the lack of trustworthiness
of PolyMet, especially in conjunction to their relationship to Glencore and as a member
of the mining industry, others saw this partnership with a big financial backer as a reason
to trust PolyMet to stick around and see their promises through. One comment, in
speaking about the lengthy and expensive permitting process that PolyMet is in the midst
of, asserted that “PolyMet themselves has financed the majority of this extensive, lengthy
process out of their own resources, again showing their dedication to the project.” An
interviewee, after speaking about the amount of time and money that PolyMet has
invested into NorthMet, said that “I've watched what they've done up till now. I've been
involved in the industry with all kinds of companies and they are not a fly-by-night.
They're here to stay. And if they weren't here to stay, then you couldn't trust them. That in
itself tells you an awful lot. They're not here for tomorrow, they're here for the long, long
term.” Glencore’s partial ownership of PolyMet provides access to financial security that
has allowed them to continue to push for NorthMet through a lengthy, expensive process
which, for some interviewees, creates a level of trust.
While three interviewees who wish to see the NorthMet project go through
ultimately stated that they trusted PolyMet, it appears that such trust is rooted firmly in
legal requirements and financial agreements rather than understood reciprocity. One
interviewee stated that:
both PolyMet and Twin Metals have stated, physically stated in front of
everybody, ‘We will meet everything or exceed everything that's required of us.’
That's pretty hard to disagree with. I don't care how you add it. If they say they
will do it and they have the financial backing to do it and they'll put the bond up
for whatever is necessary, then I don't see a negative.
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Here, it is not just that PolyMet “say[s] they will do it,” but that they simultaneously
agree to legal and financial requirements that hold them to their promises.
The Iron Range has a long history of union organizing that has helped inform this
practical accountability, though academics and community members alike have noted a
recent shift from the strong unionizing of the past (Manuel 2015). One interviewee
explained this shift, stating:
There's the old-time miners and the new time miners. Old timers would be like,
“you never trust the company. You don't trust the company. They're giving you
that information... they're talking line of bullshit… we organize. You don't trust
the man and you organize…” Then there's this new group that's like, “we're
trusting the man. Because we've got it good…” There was that level of distrust,
but now it's like there's so much trust there with them. You want to tell this new
generation to be like “you don't trust the man.”
Another participant noted the weakened voting power of the unions, asserting that
“people got smarter along the way and said, well, maybe we're going to pick who we
want, who meets our needs rather than what we were told to do.” Indeed, the historically
democrat-leaning, union-dominated voting bloc of the Iron Range has in recent elections
shifted to become more republican-leaning, though there remains a strong contingent of
union organizers. This political shift reflects shifting dynamics on the Iron Range,
including the decrease in mining industry jobs as a result of both automation and closing
mines, as well as the shrinking towns and economic depression of the Iron Range.
Using a social license to operate framework to consider public opinions about the
proposed NorthMet mine works well as a way to think about the issue by beginning with
basic questions of legitimacy, moving to credibility, and finally tackling issues of trust.
Despite its utility in framing how individuals see PolyMet, the social license to operate
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model did not fully encompass the complex landscape of the NorthMet issue, even within
the limited scope of this case study.
Social license to operate originated in the mining industry as a model for
considering how public opinion has the potential to affect a mine’s success or failure. As
such, it is best suited for considering relationships between stakeholders and the mining
company. For a more robust understanding of the landscape of public opinion, however,
it is necessary to also consider relationships between different stakeholder groups (e.g.,
including between community members, political groups or figures, regulatory agencies,
and environmental groups).
Community Dynamics
While a full discussion of the stakeholder landscape around the NorthMet issue is
not within the scope of this thesis, it is worth bringing in some of the emergent themes in
my research that speak to these relationships and their importance in shaping perception
of the issue, particularly regarding how public discourse around the NorthMet issue has
shaped community and interpersonal dynamics in the Arrowhead Region. Here,
community refers primarily to communities of place, centered in the small towns of the
sparsely populated Iron Range, where limited population and amenities force frequent
interaction between individuals with diverse beliefs and interests that might not occur as
habitually or intimately in a different geographic area. Throughout this research, the
theme of community dynamics continued to surface, including how it serves to reflect
and extend the polarization playing out on a regional, political level at a smaller,
community level.
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The consideration of the NorthMet controversy in terms of social license to
operate demonstrates a polarization of regional stakeholders as for or against the mine,
with few points of agreement, even at the lowest level of legitimacy in the SLO
framework. One interviewee spoke to what he saw as an extreme division on the Iron
Range, explaining that “PolyMet was the beginning of it. But this split in people and their
desires and attitudes is now festering worse than I've ever, ever seen it. It's hate. It's literal
hate.” The debate around PolyMet has in some ways served as a catalyst to expose some
of the tensions that have been increasing in the region around unions, politics, the
economy, and community visions for the future.
These dynamics play out in formal conversations around NorthMet, through
various organizational tactics. Prno and Slocombe point out that “civil society and market
actors now regularly share governing duties with the state” (2012:346). This sort of
governing, in the form of policing, boycotting, and shifting community dynamics, is
apparent within the small towns of the Arrowhead Region that are involved in the debate.
In one instance, an interviewee described a town hall meeting she had attended on the
issue:
The people who were for [NorthMet], they had really organized their people to
kind of be intimidating, in a way, to people that were speaking out against it. They
had given them water bottles so they would crunch the water bottles so people
couldn't hear. People were verbally called names— even by elected officials who
were in support of it. It was a very intimidating atmosphere.
Another participant explained “There's lots of advocates for the project that speak out or
write editorials. And then they kind of get people. City councils and school districts
hefting voiced support for it on the record.” Here, power is asserted and leveraged to
elevate certain opinions, both by groups of individuals who together create an

88

“intimidating” atmosphere at what is nominally an open forum for discussion of
NorthMet, and by people who hold political clout in the community.
The polarization of the NorthMet controversy is not relegated to formal
conversations about mining but plays out in more informal community settings as well.
One participant in Cook, Minnesota – a small Iron Range town with an official
population of 574 as of the 2010 census – explained this using a personal anecdote. She
had asked the city-owned liquor store if they could start carrying beer from Bent Paddle –
a regionally popular Duluth-based microbrewery that publicly supports anti-mining
organizations such as Save the Boundary Waters. She was told that:
If they started carrying that, then the whole liquor store would close down
because everybody's going to boycott because if they had that on their shelves,
then people would get the word out, an organized effort would get the word out to
say ‘don't go there because they've got that Bent Paddle on the shelf’ and he's like,
so I can order it in secret.
Another participant, who is actively involved with environmental groups organizing
against the mine described an incident in Duluth where an event for the organization
Duluth for Clean Water was cancelled by the bar where it was to be held. He went on to
explain this cancellation stating, “They thought there was gonna be a little dust up. The
proprietor canceled – didn't want the publicity, or maybe they're threatening a little
boycott.” A third participant spoke about informal boycotting, explaining that because he
knows where proprietor’s stand on the PolyMet issue, “I wouldn't step foot in some stores
that I used to shop in all the time, I just don't.” These examples demonstrate the potential
for stakeholders to wield power on a community level, by leveraging businesses to make
decisions based on public perceptions around NorthMet.
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This community divide has contributed to an inability to communicate with those
holding opposing viewpoints. For some, this has translated to not interacting with those
holding opposing viewpoints because it feels impossible. One participant explained,
“Yeah, we don't talk about the weather. Because we're so far apart. They won't listen to
anything I say. And they only want to stuff the other down your throat. I'm on a white
horse and I got a white hat, I'm saving everybody from everything.” Another explained
that he had received some verbal backlash from community members because of his
opinion on the issue, but that he believed it was toned down because of the social capital
he and his wife had built up over 30 years of living and working in the area.
For some participants, the polarizing nature of the debate has meant refraining
from broaching the subject of NorthMet in order to maintain relationships and continue
working together on other projects. One participant was initially wary of speaking with
me due to her need to remain professionally neutral because of her position in a
regionally focused nonprofit. She explained that in order for her organization to continue
functioning they refrained from taking a stance on the issue, due to widely differing
opinions among members of the organization. On a personal level, she explained that
with one particular friend and fellow political organizer, “we just can't talk about it. But
we work together for a lot of other things with, you know, health care for all or with the
farmer's market. And we just kind of sidestep that issue.” While this participant found
that she was able to continue doing community organizing despite the polarizing nature
of the issue, most participants cited the debate surrounding copper-nickel mining as
significantly detracting from the cohesion of the small communities on the Iron Range
and ability to work together.
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In addition to effects within Iron Range communities, the NorthMet controversy
has served to accentuate regional tensions for some, particularly an urban-rural divide
that differentiates between northern Minnesota’s residents and tourists, and raises the
question of who counts as a stakeholder in the issue. One interviewee, who is a long-time
resident of Ely, considered residents of the Arrowhead region as the only valid
stakeholders:
We get people coming up here [from the Twin Cities]. My god, they attend all
these public hearings, they're not stakeholders. They don't live here. We have
people that have been paying real estate taxes up here… for 30 years and 40
years. They have skin in the game. They are stakeholders… But these people that
come up here have no skin in the game… These ‘stakeholders’ that come up here
once a year, breathe the air, and go back [thinking] ‘We're stakeholders. That's
government land we own one square millimeter...’
Another participant, who lives just outside of the Duluth area, noted this dynamic of this
urban-rural division, stating that “people in northern Minnesota look at the metro area
versus the northern Minnesotans. And the same thing's going happen now between
Duluth and the Iron Range -- it's this division.” Because many individuals, businesses,
and nonprofit organizations in Duluth have been outspoken about both PolyMet and Twin
Metals, he feared that the long-standing division between the Twin Cities and “up north”
would extend to include Duluth, speaking to a common conception that it is liberal city
dwellers who are against the mines, while those who actually live on the Iron Range are
firm supporters of NorthMet.
While the conception that outsiders are against the mine and residents are for the
mine is widely perpetuated, it does not accurately capture the range of voices in northern
Minnesota. Though “the community” is often used in conversation around the NorthMet
issue (e.g., by PolyMet to simplify the issue, by residents to speak to their daily lives in a
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small town, or by academics to refer to the social fabric of the region as compared to
other regions), it does not speak to the many different communities and ranges of
viewpoints that exist in the Arrowhead Region. Seven commenters spoke to this directly,
expressing opposition to the mine after establishing themselves as residents of northeast
Minnesota, and therefore stakeholders in the issue. Four of the eight northern Minnesotan
interview participants were against the mine, though two were from the greater Duluth
area and not the smaller, old mining communities of the Iron Range.
One participant, who lives on the Iron Range, further problematizes the
conception of rural versus urban tensions and who counts as a stakeholder:
One of the criticisms has always been, oh it's just people from the Twin Cities
Center are against this. Not us people who live up here. And I think
[environmental groups] have really focused the issue of okay hey, but it's our
water and we're going to be impacted when this all... We're going feel the
downstream impacts from that…saying we do have a stake and it doesn't matter
that we don't live that we have a stake in because our water's going to be affected.
This watershed thinking has been leveraged by environmental groups and is a useful way
of thinking about environmental controversies—not just in terms of direct physical
proximity, but in terms of downstream effects that reflect scientific understandings of
how ecosystems function.
Watershed thinking further complicates understandings of the issue as
“watersheds” are expanded to include additional levels of connection between local,
regional, national, and even international actors. These types of connections and
experiences were a consistent piece of how interviewees described the NorthMet issue,
the Iron Range, and their experiences to me. Examples included regional and state-level
political dynamics, the ways in which environmental groups spoke about Iron Range
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communities, personal experiences with DNR regulation, and regional shifts from a
union-oriented, primarily democratic district to a more right-leaning district, voting for
Trump in the 2016 elections in a historic Republican upset. While these dynamics do not
fit tidily into a social license to operate framework, or within the scope of this study, they
are critical for building a comprehensive understanding of the NorthMet issue, and public
perceptions surrounding it.
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CONCLUSION
This research examines the NorthMet controversy in Minnesota by pairing a
rhetorical analysis of major interest groups with a social license to operate framework to
consider public perceptions and the concept of trust as it relates to whether an individual
chooses to support or oppose the proposed mining project. Using a breadth of sources
that include stakeholder group websites, op-eds, public comments on the Final
Environmental Impact Statement, and semi-structured in-depth interviews, this case study
serves to extend the growing body of social license to operate literature while exploring
relationships between rhetorical narratives and public response to an extremely polarizing
issue.
Summary of Findings
By considering the NorthMet controversy in terms of rhetorical strategies used by
both PolyMet and WaterLegacy, the struggle to sway public perception for or against the
mining project becomes clearer. Key rhetorical strategies implemented by PolyMet and
WaterLegacy to affect public perceptions of the proposed NorthMet mine have included:
(1) Definition, or how each group defines the issue; (2) Identification, or how each group
characterizes itself, how they characterize opponents, how they establish themselves as
members of the regional community (using a largely constructed, universalized concept
of “community” to mask the complexity of the social and political landscape of the
Arrowhead region), and how they build relationships with stakeholders; (3) Drawing
boundaries around the issue, or how each group uses spatial and temporal scope to
determine what is included in the controversy and what is obscured.
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Each of these strategies serves to present a particular narrative of the issue,
carefully curating a cast of stakeholders and defining the issue by elevating certain
aspects while excluding others. Rather than engaging in conversation, these narratives
speak across each other, attempting to sway undecided stakeholders and further
polarizing individuals on one side of the issue or the other.
The rhetorical arguments made by each side, both explicitly and implicitly, are
reflected in the public comments and interviews with residents of the Arrowhead region.
Similarly, the extreme polarization of larger organizations (e.g., PolyMet and
WaterLegacy) can be seen in the increasing polarization of smaller groups (e.g.,
community-level organizations) and individual stakeholders over the past ten years. This
polarization makes determining an overall judgment of whether or not PolyMet has
achieved social license impossible. Through an analysis of the public comments and
interviews, it is clear that PolyMet has gained all of the levels of social license from some
individuals, and none from others.
In considering legitimacy, which is the most basic requirement of social license to
operate, major concerns emerged regarding the need for jobs in the region on the one
hand and concern for environmental degradation on the other. Rather than being a
straightforward issue of jobs versus the environment, however, for many it came down to
a balancing act between two important aspects of a thriving community (i.e., a healthy
environment and sustainable livelihoods), and a careful weighing of risks versus benefits.
The legal legitimacy of the NorthMet project remained a point of contention, as many
commenters and interviewees on both sides of the issue noted that PolyMet had
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technically completed requirements for permitting, but took issue with the requirements
themselves, including with the permitting process and the regulatory agencies involved.
When considering levels of credibility (i.e., that PolyMet will follow through on
their promises) and trust (i.e., that PolyMet will work with community members towards
achieving common goals and prioritizes the good of the community), stakeholders
considered both whether PolyMet can follow through on promises and also that they will.
Comments around credibility included PolyMet’s financial ability to follow through on
promises of remediation as well as their technical ability to do so. Comments around trust
included consideration of PolyMet’s intentions around following through on those
promises. Trust also encompassed characterization of PolyMet (e.g., as a member of the
community staffed by locals or as a multi-national, greedy corporation) that established
them as “trustworthy” or not. While consideration of public comments and interviewees
using this framework allowed for a useful organization of how a variety of regional
stakeholders think about aspects of the issue and how that reflects the rhetorical strategies
implemented by larger interest groups, it fails to capture the full complexity of the
NorthMet controversy.
Arguably, the current status of the NorthMet project demonstrates that failure to
achieve all levels of social license from major stakeholder groups can have a tangible
effect on the success of a mining project. It is important to note that the social and
political capital of these stakeholder groups is a major factor in their ability to affect
meaningful change (e.g., slowing down or halting a mining project) and groups that do
not demonstrate a certain amount of clout are often left out of the conversations and
compromise that surround extractive project planning. State-level environmental groups
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such as WaterLegacy and Friends of the Boundary Waters, in partnership with larger
national-level groups, were able to rally a large number of people to their cause,
including prominent politicians and individuals with social and financial clout. Their
effectiveness is notable in the wide amount of press coverage that the PolyMet
controversy has received, as well as the unprecedented 30,441 public comments on the
FEIS. Though PolyMet successfully attained all 16 required permits and fulfilled all
legal requirements, four permits have now been overturned in court due to litigation
introduced by environmental groups and tribal entities and the permitting process has
lasted over 15 years.
Though the proposed NorthMet mine will likely still move forward despite these
hurdles (as was emphasized in every interview and informal conversation I had
stakeholders about this project), failure to achieve social license from all stakeholder
groups with social and political clout has significantly drawn out an already lengthy
permitting process and increased expenses to PolyMet in money as well as time. Prno and
Slocombe noted that to obtain social license from local communities, “early, ongoing
communication, transparent disclosure of information, development of conflict resolution
mechanisms, and culturally appropriate decision making” would be necessary
(2012:347). Holley and Mitcham, in studying SLO regarding the Pebble Mine in Alaska,
observed that incorporating public voices into the project design and negotiating risks and
benefits with community members was vital to successfully achieving SLO (2016:26).
The way that narratives crafted by the mining industry and environmental groups spoke
across each other rather than engaging in conversation, and the way similar trends played
out between local and regional stakeholders (e.g., crumpling water bottles during a town
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hall to physically silence the opposing side), demonstrates a failure to maintain the
ongoing mechanisms called for by Prno and Slocombe and engage in the involvement of
community voices in the planning process called for by Holley and Mitcham.
This failure to engage adequately with opposing stakeholders throughout the
process, and the increasing polarization of individuals and stakeholder groups along the
way, echoes issues noted by Holley and Mitcham in the Alaska. They note that
companies did not adequately engage with the community throughout the planning
process, which would have included addressing stakeholder concerns, working together
to create “shared goals,” and collaborating on the mining plan to provide maximum
benefits to the community (2016:25). Rhetorical strategies implemented by PolyMet
nominally speak to concerns around pollution and economy and work to establish
credibility as a member of the community working to see it thrive. Looking at public
comments, conducting interviews, and watching current litigation, however, seems to
indicate a failure to collaborate more broadly with stakeholder groups, instead focusing
on certain stakeholders who may already support the mining industry. Though failure to
achieve a broad social license has not necessarily brought PolyMet to a stand-still, it has
significantly slowed the permitting process and pushed back the timeline of the proposed
mine.

Limitations
In taking on the lengthy and wide-reaching controversy surrounding the proposed
NorthMet mine for a thesis-sized research project, my scope was necessarily narrow.
Limitations of the study, as noted in the methods chapter, include simplification in terms
of quantity of data and breadth of stakeholder voices. A more robust case study would
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include more stakeholder groups, particularly indigenous voices, and a larger pool of
public comments and interviews. While the random sampling of 100 comments included
commenters on both sides of the issue, the great majority took a stance against the mine.
It would be worth considering who is participating in the public commenting period and
who has chosen not to and working to incorporate those voices into future studies. This
case study was focused on those who had engaged in opportunities for public
participation throughout the permitting process, but by drawing those boundaries of
scope, failed to capture the full range of public perceptions on the NorthMet project.
Another major limitation was time. My research took place during 2019-2020,
which is a small piece of a permitting process that is far from over. Further, because my
time on the ground was limited to about one week, I was restricted in the amount of
community engagement and rapport I was able to build. A more robust study might allow
for multiple months on the Iron Range, building relationships in the community and
gaining a thicker experiential understanding of this complex issue.

Future Research and Concluding Thoughts
Despite these limitations, this case study adds to the growing body of literature
that considers extractive issues in terms of social license to operate. By pairing an SLO
analysis with a consideration of rhetorical strategies, this research works to provide depth
the SLO framework, applying it not only to public perceptions of the issue but also how
rhetoric has served to affect those perceptions. More case studies are necessary to
continue to build social license to operate into a more comprehensive framework and
further transition it out of the business sector and into academic use, with a focus on
shifting the framework to be less biased towards extractive industry. Used within the
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mining industry, “successful” implementation of a social license to operate model
indicates public support of a particular mining project. Used as an academic framework,
this should not be the underlying assumption.
Expanding application of the SLO framework to include analysis of how
individuals and stakeholder groups perceive other large interest groups (e.g.,
environmental groups, governmental agencies) could help start to dismantle these biases
while further excavating the complexities of a given case study and giving greater depth
to individual histories and experiences that color how they define the issue. Arguably, the
more complexity allowed for within a framework, the less easy it is to see issues as
binaries and dig into the trenches of extreme polarization.
One interviewee shared a sentiment that has stuck with me throughout this
research. She said that while collaboration may have been possible at the earliest
meetings, where both sides were still sitting down, there was no way anyone could agree
on anything now. It was too late. This sort of polarization is not unique to the Iron Range.
Recent large-scale confrontations, such as the 2016-2017 Dakota Access Pipeline protests
at Standing Rock, demonstrate a climate of increasing division and combativeness
between extractive industries, environmental advocates, and the communities that exist in
the midst of the struggle (often as participants). In Minnesota, while the issue plays out in
the courts on a regional and national level, issues of livelihood and community are
affected on a local level, where extractive industry jobs continue to decrease, and the
effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the regional tourist industry is yet to be realized.
Future case studies on the NorthMet controversy in Minnesota could pick up
where this one left off and extend the SLO framework in light of how current litigation
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plays out. Additionally, it could build on the data from this study by including a broader
consideration of stakeholder groups and more community-based research, where
questions and research trajectories are determined in collaboration with community
members. This type of participatory research is critical for an inclusive narrative and
analysis of the NorthMet controversy, allowing the deep, place-based histories of
residents to shed light on the complexities of the issue and perhaps arrive at a way to
move forward and revive the once thriving communities of the Iron Range.
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APPENDIX A – SOURCES OF FORM LETTERS FOR THE FEIS

SOURCES OF FORM LETTERS FOR THE FEIS
Affliiated Organization(s)

Number of Submissions

Mining Truth, Conservation Minnesota, WaterLegacy, MEP

12,716

League of Conservation Voters

6,202

Sierra Club

4,718

Mining Minnesota

3,016

Center for Biological Diversity

2,843

Izaak Walton League

101

League of Women Voters MN

26

YMCA Camp Menogyn

22

Building Trades

4
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APPENDIX B – DNR CODES FOR PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE FEIS
List of 27 topic codes utilized by the DNR to categorize public comments on the Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS):
-

Air Quality
Alternatives
Aquatic Species
US Army Corps of Engineers 404 Permit
Cultural Resources
Cumulative Effects
Editorial (errors within FEIS text)
Financial Assurance
General Topics
Geotechnical Stability
Hazardous Materials
Human Health and Safety
USFS Land Exchange
Land Use, Recreation, and Visual Resources
MEPA Adequacy
Mercury
Noise and Vibration
NEPA and MEPA Topics
Other
Project Description
Permitting and Regulatory Considerations
USFS Draft ROD
Socioeconomics and Environmental Justice
Vegetation
Water Resources
Wetlands
Terrestrial Wildlife
Wilderness and Special Designation Areas
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APPENDIX C – INTERVIEW GUIDE
Thanks for taking the time to sit down with me for this interview. These interviews are
part of a larger study I’m doing, where I’m trying to understand how folks like you are
thinking about the proposed NorthMet mine and your views the process. I have questions
for you about your experiences in the region, how you see the issue of PolyMet, how
you’ve gotten involved in the permitting process, what you’d like to see the Iron Range
look like in the future, that sort of thing.
Before we begin, I want to let you know that your identity as a participant in this
interview will remain confidential and I won’t use your name in any presentations or
written reports. This is so you can speak your mind without worrying about what you say
becoming publicly linked to you.
With your permission, I’d like to record the interview to maintain accuracy and better
focus on our conversation without worrying about writing everything down. Is that
alright with you?
Background, I grew up in St. Paul and, while I have spent time in northern Minnesota, I
do`n’t know the Iron Range very well. [To get some background on the issue I looked at a
bunch of comments on the final EIS to see what people see as the major issues at stake in
the proposed NorthMet mine.]
1. How would you describe the area?
[potential probes if this doesn’t spark much of a response: how long have you lived here?
What are some of the things you value most about the region? What are some of the
biggest challenges you have here?]
Process Now that we’ve talked about the region in broader terms, I’d like to hear about
your experience throughout the ten years (!) of the permitting process.
2. Tell me about how you first became involved with the proposed mine.
a. When was that?
b. Why did you decide to get involved?
3. Did you submit a public comment on any of the Environmental Impact Statements
or participate in other aspects of the permitting process (such as attending
meetings, writing editorials or other things like that)? Why or why not?
4. How, if at all, has your understanding of the issue and opinion about the mine
changed throughout the permitting process?
5. When you think about DNR’s permitting process, what do you think they’ve done
well?
a. Anything else?
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6. What do you think they could have done better?
a. Anything else?
7. Do you trust the permitting process?
[potential probes if this doesn’t spark much of a response: In other words, do you feel
like the permitting process does a good job of involving community? Do you feel like
it does a good job of researching and setting in place regulations that will lead to a
positive outcome? Do you trust that the regulators are working towards the best
outcome for the region?]
Credibility / Legitimacy Let’s move away from the permitting process and talk a little
more about the nitty-gritty issues of the mine itself.
8. What do you see as potential benefits of the NorthMet mine?
a. What’s the best way these benefits happen?
9. What do you see as potential downsides of the NorthMet mine?
a. What should happen to address those potential downsides?
Trust Let’s talk a bit about the idea of trust when it comes to some of the major interest
groups at play, including PolyMet, environmental groups, and the DNR. Considering the
regulators and permitting process as separate from the mine itself,
10. When you’re trying to find information about this issue, who do you listen to or
consider the best source of information on this issue? Why?
a. Are there any major voices in the debate who you don’t listen to….?
11. How would you describe your relationship with PolyMet? In other words, have
you had any positive or negative interactions with folks from PolyMet or PolyMet
as an institution?
12. Over the past ten years are there ways that PolyMet has gotten involved in the
community?
13. Do you trust PolyMet?
a. Probe: to follow through on their promises?
14. Do you trust the environmental groups who have been involved in the PolyMet
debate (such as WaterLegacy, Friends of the Boundary Waters, and others).
15. Do you trust the DNR? Governer’s office? Minnesota Pollution Control Agency?
Winding down I’d like to take a step back from these big questions about the permitting
process and the mine itself for a moment and return to this landscape and your place in
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it. This issue has been in the public eye for over a decade now. I’m curious how you feel
like this has affected the Iron Range community.
16. How has this debate affected community dynamics?
17. When you think twenty-five years down the road, what would you like to see the
community look like?
a. If it happens if it doesn’t happen
18. Those are all the formal questions I have for you. Is there anything we didn’t
cover that you think we should talk about?
Thank you so much for chatting with me about your home and your experience with the
proposed mine. Do you have any questions for me? If you have anything you’d like to add
or clarify about what we talked about, you can reach me here (have something with
phone number and email address).
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